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When Franklin Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, the 
United States was emerging from her most debilitating war 
and seemed intent on "getting back to normal" as quickly 
as possible.  Harry Truman was thrust into the presidency at 
the death of one of the most revered men who ever led the 
country.  The "accidental" president had no national follow- 
ing at the time of his accession to the office.  Therefore, 
Truman appeared to be the least likely president to begin 
the campaign for civil rights for Negroes, and 1948 and the 
Democratic Party national convention the least likely time 
and place to take such a stand. 
On the surface it seemed improbable that either party 
would sponsor dramatic reform programs.  In the face of 
foreign events, it seemed more politic to fill the party's 
platform with platitudes about the free world and self-defense 
Theoretically, a country turns away from internal problems in 
time of war and unites behind the leadership to win.  Within 
this framework, it is logical to assume that once a war is 
over, all the internal problems erupt and demand attention. 
The year 1948 fits chronologically into this pattern, but the 
nation was still in the grip of war psychosis.  The emergence 
of the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States 
produced almost the same demand for unity that a full-fledged 
war summons, and Harry Truman was the proponent of an almost 
warlike attitude toward the Soviet Union.  Yet he did not 
use the external threat to suppress internal reform.  He 
supported the liberals within his party who wanted to recog- 
nize and ameliorate the problems of the American Negro. 
This thesis attempts to delineate the various inter- 
pretations of Truman's actions.  The first part of the paper 
is a brief outline of the gains the Negro made, or failed to 
make, under the New Deal.  The bulk of the paper is concern- 
ed with the most common interpretation given to Truman's 
actions.  Most of the history written on Truman reflects a 
disparaging attitude toward Truman's efforts to act on civil 
rights.  More attention is paid to what he did not do than 
to what he did accomplish.1 The general impression given is 
that he did not do as much for the Negro as did Roosevelt. 
This pro-Roosevent bias is most evident in "liberal" his- 
tories2 which almost glorify Roosevelt, giving scant attention 
to the political compromises he had to make.  The implication 
always lurks underneath the surface that Truman somehow does 
not measure up as a liberal when compared to Roosevelt. 
This writer feels that Truman deserves better than a 
grudging admission that he did do "something" to help the 
Negro secure his rights.  There is also a strong indication 
that the President acted out of something more than a regard 
^■Barton Bernstein is an example of this. 
2Eric Goldman and Herbert Feis are examples of "liberal" 
i...  nv  M a. v^nkataramani termed them "court histon- historians.  Dr. M. S. Venkatarama 
ans. 
for mere politics.  Between 1945 and 1948 there was an in- 
creasing awareness of the legitimacy of the Negro's demands 
and the Truman administration attempted to meet the pro- 
blem with federal programs.  After 1948, the main impetus 
to civil rights was provided by the federal courts.  The 
third stage was finally reached in the United States Con- 
gress in 1964-65. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The subject of Harry Truman and civil rights has 
received considerable attention from scholars, journalists, 
and, of course, blacks.  It seemed to shock self-proclaimed 
liberals that Truman took a firmer stand on civil rights 
than did Franklin Roosevelt.  As a border state southerner, 
Truman had not cultivated a reputation as an advocate of 
civil rights while in the Senate.  To both professional lib- 
erals and staunch racists, Truman could have had only one 
motive for adopting civil rights as an issue:  politics. 
Politics from time to time changes from a definition 
of political activity to a dirty word.  In 1948, as now, 
"politics" and "politicians" are terms of opprobrium closely 
approximating illegal activity.  The popular assumption is 
that no elected or appointed official in government is able 
or willing to work hard or serve his country.  It is assumed 
that all governmental figures work only for their own advance- 
ment and spend most of their time giving and accepting bribes. 
Though this accusation is an over-simplification of a complex 
process, the popular press abounds with expose* stories implying 
corruption in government.  Obviously, the republic would have 
succumbed long before now had all these accusations been 
true. 
The disgust with politics stems from a basic misunder- 
standing of America's form of government.  At the risk of 
sounding simplistic, it is necessary to differentiate between 
a republic and a democracy.  The United States government is 
a republic, and the registered voters of the country choose 
men at all levels of government to make decisions necessary 
to run the country.  The key point to make here is that a 
man must appeal to various groups, usually called interest 
groups, in order to get elected.  Once in office, a man 
listens to those who helped him reach office, but there is 
nothing sinister or intrinsically dishonest about this. 
The style of American government is a competition between 
interest groups.1  It resembles the adversary system of 
justice.  The side which makes the best case wins.  This 
system has its flaws; as great lobbies go into action to 
achieve or thwart governmental action, the interests of those 
who belong to no mass grouping can be ignored.  But now even 
consumers and housewives have a champion in Ralph Nader. 
As the editor of the Crisis wrote, "it pays Negroes, indeed, 
all Americans, to have a continuing [sic] organized group 
like the NAACP in existence."2 
Representative statements of this conception of 
American government, in which this point of view is described 
at length, are V. 0. Key, Parties, Politics, and Pressure 
Groups, and Ranney and Kendall, Democracy and the American 
Party System. 
2"Editorial," Crisis, January, 1948, p. 9. 
Given this system, the charge that something is done 
"just for politics" is ridiculous since practically every 
piece of legislation or governmental activity is an attempt 
to please one interest group or another.  The way to have 
an effect on government is to join and support the interest 
groups of one's choice.  In this way one can vote for those 
who favor one's particular interest.  This sounds undemocratic 
and hints of machine politics, but at least such participation 
can provide an informed vote rather than a popularity contest 
based on good looks.  Only when elections are contested on 
the basis of issues can the results have any meaning. 
Interest groups are most influential at election time 
and at decision-making time in the government.  Interest 
groups get out their voting faithful, then press elected 
officials for favorable decisions.  Legislation reflects the 
results of organized opinion, not the highminded ideals of 
legislators.  Therefore, one can assume that race and minority 
rights did not become a matter of governmental concern until 
Negroes organized themselves and were able to show muscle 
at the polls.  The recognition of Negro problems came slowly 
to this country and its leaders, and the charge that Truman 
merely supported civil rights because it offered political 
advantage is naive, yet this is the most common interpretation 
this writer discovered.3  The charge indicates that action on 
3william Berman, Barton Bernstein, Samuel Lubell, and 
Clifton Brock tend to belittle Truman's motives and abilities. 
Their condescension toward an uneducated midwestern  common 
man is evident to this author. 
civil rights is without value unless motivated by high ideals. 
The self-proclaimed liberals can exhibit disgust at Truman's 
"using" civil rights, but he did contribute to a reversal of 
a policy of inaction and rhetoric while most liberals still 
sent their children to private schools and lived in exclusive 
neighborhoods. 
John Kennedy believed that "politics is an honorable 
profession" and never winced at being called a politician. 
He understood the necessity, given human nature, of bargain- 
ing and compromising to effect even the most laudable policies. 
It is to his credit that he managed to make the whole process 
look glamorous and modern.  Eisenhower had disliked politics 
and considered himself above all such pettiness.  President 
Truman had Kennedy's relish for political battles, but was 
unable to glamorize his style.  He was able to win respect 
for his policies only when he went to the people directly 
and let them hear and "feel" his basic decency.  He did not 
look or talk like a cheap politician in person; Thomas 
Dewey, who posed as the young statesman, did.  Truman provided 
the combination of commitment and political savvy which enabled 
him to remind voters that the end of price controls was the 
result of politics, that the lack of public housing was 
politics, and that the exploitation of Negroes was politics, 
too.  The young statesman, Dewey, and his non-political party 
seemed to be pursuing their goals in a surprisingly political 
manner. 
This paper will not claim that Harry Truman was a 
model liberal.  He saw political realities:  Negroes were 
concentrated in important northern cities.  Politicians from 
these areas demonstrated their concern for the Negro vote. 
Truman himself knew the importance of the Negro vote in his 
own re-election to the Senate in 1940.  But President Truman 
was also, more importantly, a decent man who believed the 
Constitution applied to all Americans.  With less than the 
highest ideals, President Truman did begin to educate the 
country to the necessity of civil rights legislation and 
achieved more by executive order and example than did his 
predecessors.  The Democratic Party gave notice of its 
recoqnition of Negro political power in 1948 when it included 
a civil rights plank in its platform in defiance of southern 
Democrats. 
The story of the adoption of civil rights as an issue 
by Truman and the Democratic Party is the subiect of the 
following paper.  The key points of interest will be the 
relative degree of political motivation and personal idealism 
present in the main characters who advocated the Negro's 
cause to the President and the Democratic Party.  The main 
argument, which underlies the entire exposition, is that 
liberal historians and political scientists may be correct 
in stating that Truman's civil rights program was extremely 
limited.  They may even say that the courts, not the executive, 
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led the civil rights revolution.  But they can not deny that 
the President did act more firmly and openly in support of 
civil rights than any other President. 
IMITATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS 
The New Deal Legacy 
Franklin D. Roosevelt is still a hero to those who 
suffered during the Depression.  His famous optimism and 
concern managed to help people even when some of the New 
Deal programs failed.  Perhaps the feeling that the President 
"really cared" impressed the unemployed or very poor more 
than federal programs ever could.  The relief and welfare 
agencies set up under the New Deal helped millions to eat, 
but President Roosevelt gave a sense of self-respect to 
those dislocated by the economic crisis.  He deserves praise 
for many programs; but in the area of civil rights, there 
is room for criticism. 
Much of the New Deal was an economic program designed 
to regulate the abuses of large corporations and financial 
institutions.  In curbing abuses, the New Deal programs regu- 
lated working hours, working conditions, and wages.  It 
strengthened labor unions, and, in the long run, gave workers 
a chance to improve their lot.  To help those who did not 
have jobs in private industry, the federal government under- 
took its own massive building projects and employed enlightened 
labor practices.  Those who could not find work or were unable 
to work received welfare payments of various kinds.  These 
programs were aimed at "the poor," but no special legislation 
or action was uniquely designed for the poorest of the poor, 
the Negro.1 
The New Deal was important to the Negro primarily 
because the programs did something for the underprivileged 
without excluding him.2  Before the New Deal, the "Negro 
Problem" was confined to civil rights, education, charity 
and little more.  By 1944, it involved "housing, nutrition, 
medicine, education, relief and social security, wages and 
hours, working conditions, child and woman labor, and lately 
(194 4) the armed forces and the war industries."^  It cannot 
be denied, however, that the Negro shared unequally in these 
advances.  Franklin Roosevelt spoke "feelingly of the un- 
fortunate, yet he understood and did not expect any rapid 
change in the existing class relationships.  But he did mean 
to raise the minimum levels."4  The Negro only received 
1Barton J. Bernstein, The Ambiguous Legacy:  The Truman 
Administration and Civil Rights, a paper read at the American 
Historical Association Meeting in New York, December 29, 1966, 
Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, p. 1. 
2Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma:  The Negro Problem 
and Modern Democracy (New York:  Harper & Bros., 1944), p. 74. 
3Ibid. 
4Rexford  Tugwell,   The  Democratic   Roosevelt   (New  York: 
Doubleday,   1957),   p.    358. 
attention in a tangential way.  As this section will illustrate, 
the New Deal abided by existing racial discrimination in all 
areas, and, indeed, imposed discrimination in areas where it 
had not existed previously. 
The question of Roosevelt's personal attitude toward 
the race problem is fascinating and will be debated for years 
to come.  Roosevelt apologists contend that he only accepted 
discrimination because he needed southern support for his 
New Deal programs and later for war preparedness.5  Southern 
Democrats saw to it that any help specifically for the 
Negroes was blocked,6 and the President acquiesced.  Supposed- 
ly, the Negroes would be helped by a general improvement 
of economic conditions, and their special problems would have 
to go unsolved, a sacrifice to the enactment of legislation 
for the general good.  It is, however, hard to believe that 
the South, the poorest, almost colonial, area of the country 
would oppose legislation to curb financial and industrial 
exploitation.  Southern agriculture was a particularly depress- 
ed sector of the economy, and the South simply could not 
refuse aid from the government.  The farm subsidies and welfare 
payments given to poor whites made Roosevelt so popular that 
5Walter White, A Man Called White (New York:  Viking 
Press, 1948), p. 169.  White quotes the President as saying 
this when he was asked to support a fair employment practices 
act. 
6Tugwell, Democratic Roosevelt, p. 358. 
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his occasional espousal of Negro causes was mutely accepted. 
He was so popular with the poor white southerner that even 
the racists refrained from calling him a "nigger lover," 
that kiss of death to liberals in the South.7  It is worth 
asking, therefore, if Roosevelt could not have gone over the 
heads of southern racists (who, according to V. 0. Key, were 
generally puppets of northern industry), and made an appeal 
to the voters for support of programs to help those who 
were suffering most--the rural Negroes. 
Instead, the Administration, despite its liberal, 
humanitarian cast, perhaps actually hurt the Negro more than 
it helped him.  The Department of Agriculture under Henry 
Wallace is an example of this.  The Department of Agriculture 
contained a cluster of Felix Frankfurter's bright young men, 
and it was expected to do great things for the suffering 
farmers.  Some of the more famous of these men were Guy 
Tugwell, Jerome Frank, Adlai Stevenson, Thurman Arnold, Abe 
Fortas, Alger Hiss, Lee Pressman, John Abt, and Nathan Witt. 
Since these were mainly "city boys," they were expected to 
develop a farm policy along rational, not traditional lines. 
The program which evolved was based on classical 
economics, the law of supply and demand, not on a new method 
to distribute surplus food to starving people.  The Domestic 
8 
7Myrdal,   American  Dilemma,   p.   464. 
8Charles E.   Jacob,   Leadership in the New Deal: the 
Administrative  Challenge   (New  Jersey:      Prentice Hall,   1967), 
p.   15. 
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Allotment Plan was designed to help the land owners, not the 
2.9 million tenant farmers.  When production acreage was re- 
duced, the owners were compensated, and since they needed 
fewer tenants, they released the tenants from the land.  The 
result of enlightened and revolutionary agricultural policy 
was to drive the very poorest to desperation.  No statistics 
exist to describe how much tenant farmers and families 
suffered as a result of the Domestic Allotment Plan, but 
the growing number of Negroes and poor whites in cities and 
in the North was a direct result of that policy.9  Harry 
Truman had to deal with the massive population shift after 
the war.  Farm relief reached only 50,000 Negro families.10 
There were other flaws in what Roosevelt called Dr. 
New Deal.  It did not embrace an anti-lynch law or oppose 
the poll tax.  On federal projects like Boulder Dam and 
T.V.A., Negroes were not allowed to live in government-built 
towns.  No Negro could get an F.H.A. insured loan on a house 
outside a Negro neighborhood, and the military remained 
segregated.  There were very few Negroes in supervising or 
executive positions even within the civil service.  Rather 
9M. S. Venkataramani, "Norman Thomas and the Farmers 
Union in Arkansas," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 
October, 19 60. 
10"The Roosevelt Record," Crisis, November, 1940. 
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than make a Negro a supervisor, the technique was to establish 
an advisor on Negro affairs.11  Finally, New Deal legislation 
maintained the wage differential between white and black 
even though Harry Hopkins and Aubrey Williams of the National 
Youth Administration fought this discrimination.  Roosevelt 
was unwilling to fight the racist wing of the Democratic 
Party.12 
The benefits which the New Deal brought to the Negro 
were minimal.  He was not given a chance at better jobs or 
equal pay for equal work.  He was confined to living in 
Negro neighborhoods.  He was still denied the vote in the 
South.13 Nevertheless, there was a feeling among blacks 
at that time that Roosevelt would insist that Negroes were 
part of America and must be considered in any program for 
the country as a whole.14 One reason for this confidence 
was the President's wife. 
Hlbid. 
^Leslie H. Fishel, Jr. and Benjamin Quarles, The 
Black American:  A Documentary History (Illinois:  Scott, 
Foresman & Co., 1967), p. 455. 
13Richard Bardolph, The Negro Vanguard (New York: 
Rinehart, 1959), p. 256.  In 1940, according to Dr. Bardolph, 
there were barely 200,000 registered Negro voters in the South 
^"Roosevelt Record," Crisis, November 1940. 
. 
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Eleanor Roosevelt was a prominent champion of racial 
harmony, and believed that once the Negro had educational 
opportunities, discrimination would vanish in the face of 
intellectual improvement.15  Her prime function in race rela- 
tions was to speak for the Negro to the President and for 
the President to the Negro.  She was helped in her liaison 
work by Harold Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, Oscar 
Chapman, Undersecretary of the Interior, and Dr. W. W. Alexan- 
der, a consultant on minority groups to the War Production 
Board.  With them worked the self-proclaimed "black cabinet" 
which gave a great deal of pride to the black community.16 
Although, as previously mentioned, these men were advisors 
on Negro affairs rather than actual officials, their presence 
insured a recognition of the Negro's side of a problem. 
Robert C. Weaver was a protege of Harold Ickes' and served 
as racial advisor to the Department of the Interior.  William 
H. Hastie served as a civilian aide to Secretary of War Stim- 
son, and Benjamin 0. Davis was the sole Negro general. 
Public relations expert Ted Poston was racial advisor to 
Elmer Davis of the Office of War Information.  Frank S. Home 
was the racial advisor to the Federal Public Housing Administra- 
tion.17  In this way, the Negro was at least represented in 
15Fishel, Black American, p. 462. 
16Roi Ottley, New World a-Coming;  Inside Black 
America (Boston:  Houghton Mifflin, 1943), p. 257. 
17Ibid., p. 263. 
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the area of public works, the military, war propaganda, and 
public housing, even if he had no significant political 
weight as yet.  The Negro did not achieve political weight 
until the end of the war when enough Negroes had moved north 
to form a sizable bloc vote; but that is the subject of a 
later section. 
There were at least two occasions, however, when the 
Negro demonstrated his growing political strength and his 
increasing determination to secure his rights.  The first 
occasion was in Detroit in a dispute over the building of 
public housing.  In 1942, the government began building low 
cost public housing, which was allotted to whites only. 
The Negro press and the "black cabinet" kept up such a 
barrage of protest that riots broke out.  As a result, the 
Sojourner Truth Homes, named after a woman evangelist, were 
completed as Negro housing.18  The second occasion was the 
proposed March on Washington to demand a Federal Fair Employ- 
ment Practices Commission.19  This battle has a long, hoary 
history and indicates that the pressures of Dr. Win the 
War helped the Negro more than Dr. New Deal. 
The march was conceived as a means to protest the 
fact that in 1941 with the nation re-arming and the defense 
industry booming, only 2.5% of the workers in defense industry 
ISibid., p. 266. 
^Hereinafter cited as FEPC. 
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was non-white.20  Black representatives had met with Sidney 
Hillman and William Knudsen who were the co-chairmen of the 
National Defense Board.  In his typical fashion, Roosevelt 
had appointed opposites to work together.  Hillman was a 
labor leader who, in 1948, fought for the liberal civil rights 
plank in the Democratic platform.  Knudsen was the ex-head 
of General Motors and he refused to work for Negro employ- 
ment opportunities.  Industry took its cue from Knudsen and 
resisted hiring Negroes, despite Hillman's successful efforts 
to get labor to accept Negro co-workers.  Roosevelt, accord- 
ing to Walter White, the head of the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People,21 refused to take a 
stand against this discrimination because he said the South 
would revolt and it would upset the war effort.22 
Since Roosevelt had refused to push for employment 
opportunities for Negroes, A. Philip Randolph, president of 
the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, and other Negro 
leaders threatened a March on Washington.23  The President 
sent his wife to try to get the march cancelled, but even 
she was refused.  The black leaders were determined to get 
20Myrdal, American Dilemma, p. 412. 
^Hereinafter cited as the NAACP. 
22Louis Ruchames, Race, Jobs and Politics:  The Story 
)f FEPC (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1953), pp. 1Z-ZZ, 
23Myrdal, American Dilemma, p. 414. 
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the President to take a stand against discrimination.  Finally, 
just before the threatened march, the President met with 
Randolph, White and representatives of the Army, Navy, and 
the War Production Board.  He was finally convinced that he 
had to act or there would be a demonstration by the blacks 
which would have serious effect on American morale and which 
would provide the Nazis with propaganda material.24 
The result of this pressure was Executive Order 8802, 
issued June 25, 1941, two days before the march was sche- 
duled.  The order set up a President's Committee on Fair 
Employment Practices to receive and investigate complaints. 
The committee had no power to enforce compliance and could 
only use moral suasion and publicity as weapons.  As long 
as the President stood behind the committee, it could have 
a limited success.  The creation of such a committee was 
itself important as it represented "the most definite break 
in the tradition of federal unconcernedness about racial 
discrimination on the nonfarm labor market that has so far 
occurred."26  Even William H. Hastie, Stimson's racial 
advisor, agreed that at first the federal government took 
25 
240ttley, New World, p. 292. 
25Myrdal, American Dilemma, p. 415. 
26ibid., p. 416 
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definite steps to halt racial discrimination in war indus- 
tries.27  But the honeymoon lasted less than a year. 
Roosevelt, while personally upset at specific abuses, would 
not spend political capital to boost the FEPC.  He transferred 
the committee to Paul McNutt's War Manpower Commission in 
the summer of 1942, and the committee could no longer report 
directly to the President to win his personal support.  What 
little influence it had had was ended.28  AS Roosevelt bio- 
grapher James Macgregor Burns recounts, "his tendency in 
wartime [was] to look on race relations more as a problem 
of efficient industrial mobilization than as a fundamental 
moral problem. "*" 
The handling of the armed forces demonstrates the 
same semblance of movement which made the President look as 
though he were achieving more than he really was.  In October, 
1940, the War Department announced that Negro personnel 
should be increased in such a way that Negroes would consti- 
tute the same proportion in the Army as in the general 
population.  This was designed to counteract the notion that 
Negroes do not make good soldiers.  But those who were inducted 
27Fishel, Black American, p. 473. 
Macgregor Burns, Roosevelt:  Soldier of Freedom 
court, Brace & Company, 19/U), p. 265. 
29Ibid., p. 266. 
28James 
(New York:  Har 
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were kept strictly segregated.30  The President supported 
Secretary of War Stimson who believed that "The Negro still 
lacks the particular initiative which a commanding officer of 
men needs in war."31 The Navy had no Negroes except a few 
messmen.  The Air Force under Stuart Symington, had Negro 
pilots, thanks partially to the support of Harry S Truman, 
the senator from Missouri.  In May, 1939, after meeting 
two Negro pilots who had flown a biplane from Chicago to 
Washington, D. C, Truman agreed to support legislation to 
assure training of Negroes under the Civilian Pilot Training 
Program.32  The Negroes flew, but in segregated squadrons. 
Incredibly, Negro Military Police were not allowed to carry 
guns in the South and Negro troops were harrassed by police 
while marching in formation with a white officer.33  On 
one issue, at least, Stimson deserves credit.  Many foreign 
nations did not want to accept black American soldiers, but 
Stimson held his ground and insisted all American troops be 
accepted.34  But Roosevelt and Stimson refused to integrate 
York: 
30Myrdal, American Dilemma, p. 420. 
3lBurns, Roosevelt, p. 265. 
32Lee Nichols, Breakthrough on the Color Front (New 
Random House, 1954), p. 83. 
33Myrdal, American Dilemma, p. 422. 
34Burns, Roosevelt, p. 266. 
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the services because it might harm the war effort.  Stimson's 
racial advisor, William H. Hastie, resigned because no action 
was taken to end discrimination. Hastie argued in vain that 
discrimination destroyed fighting ability and demoralized 
the black troops. ■"  The war itself was being fought to 
guarantee racial toleration, cooperation and equality, but 
the United States was fighting it with segregated troops. 
Other areas of federal action to help the Negro were 
equally unsuccessful.  The Office of Education issued a 
plea to white southern universities to admit Negro scholars. 
The Jackson Mississippi Daily News told the department to 
"go straight to hell. . . . Nobody but an ignorant, fat- 
headed ass would propose such an unthinkable and impossible 
action."36  The matter was dropped. 
The Federal Housing Authority regulated public housing 
according to "local custom." When in doubt, however, it 
always provided segregated housing.  In some areas, like 
Ann Arbor, Michigan, the Federal Housing Authority actually 
instituted segregated housing in a previously integrated 
area.3' 
Malcolm Ross of the FEPC suggested that Warm Springs 
facilities be used for Negroes, no doubt for reasons of public 
35Fishel, Black American, pp. 473-475.  Truman later 
appointed Hastie governor ot tne Virgin Islands. 
36Burns, Roosevelt, p. 463. 
37Ibid., p. 466. 
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relations.  The President wrote to his wife instructing her 
to refuse, pointing out that Tuskegee Institute had a whole 
unit of its own.38  Yet, with no sense of hypocrisy, on 
October 12, 1942, Roosevelt chided employers who would not 
hire Negroes and women in one of his fireside chats.39 
Evidently, the President regretted the gross injus- 
tices done the Negro, but he was somewhat prejudiced himself, 
and acted more from noblesse oblige than conviction.  He 
was also unwilling to sacrifice his New Deal proposals, and 
later the war effort, in what he considered a futile attempt 
to change racial relations. 
He was a political man, a democrat; he believed 
in getting things done with full, if not always 
complete consent.  Getting this approval very often 
required compromise.  He took what he could get for 
what he had to give.40 
He was willing to let racial prejudice prevail if in return 
he could get support on matters he considered more important. 
The picture was not unreservedly grim, however.  At 
times, the President would balk at the dominance of conserva- 
tives.  His famous legislative purge in 1938 was aimed at 
"the reactionary elements in the South."    He learned by 
York: 
38Ibid., p. 463. 
39lbid., p. 271. 
40Tugwell, Democratic Roosevelt, p. 10. 
41samuel J. Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt (New 
Harper's Bros., 1952), p. 463. 
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his lack of success that the only way to reconstruct the 
South was to change the voting laws.  The Negroes and the 
poor in general were barred by the poll tax; when the poll 
tax could be eliminated, the reactionaries would begin to 
fall. 
By 1944, the President had decided the two parties 
needed realignment.  Wendell Willkie, who had run against 
Roosevelt in 1940, had proposed a sharp division between the 
conservatives and liberals into two parties.  All the liberals 
would enter the Democratic Party, conservatives the Republi- 
can.  That way, the liberals would run their party unfettered 
by the old guard, and naturally win all the elections. 
Roosevelt sympathized, "I think the time has come for the 
Democratic Party to get rid of its reactionary elements in 
the South and to attract to it the liberals in the Republican 
Party."42  For obvious political reasons, the meeting be- 
tween Willkie and Roosevelt's liaison, Samuel Rosenman, was 
delayed until after the 1944 election.  With great secrecy, 
Willkie and Rosenman met and discussed how the new liberal 
party could be formed.  They parted in good spirits and 
high hopes, but Roosevelt never mentioned it again."3 one 
theory of the collapse of the realignment is that Willkie 
had become too idealistic.  He had visions of a world 
42Ibid., p. 463. 
43Ibid. 
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government and universal brotherhood.  He had become a 
disciple of Gunnar Myrdal and strongly advocated civil 
rights.44  He was considered a close personal friend of 
Walter White, and made no secret of his disapproval of racial 
bias.  Generally speaking, he simply went too far for the 
President, although Roosevelt had turned again to domestic 
issues in his 1944 campaign. 
On October 31, 1944, while campaigning in Chicago, 
he said, 
In the America of tomorrow . . . our Economic 
Bill of Rights . . . must be applied to all our 
citizens, irrespective of race,creed or color. . . . 
I believe that the Congress of the United States 
should by law make the [FEPC] Committee permanent.45 
In reply to Republicans who had been attacking Sidney Hillman 
as the real boss46 of the party and the President, Roosevelt 
deplored the blatant anti-Semitism being used.  In Boston 
he said, 
It is our duty to them [soldiers] to make sure, 
big as this country is, there is not room in 
it for racial or religious intolerance—and 
that there is no room for snobbery.4' 
Just before his death, the President seemed to be groping 
for the humanitarian ideals of the New Deal, and by that time 
44Burns, Roosevelt, p. 512. 
45Rosenman, Working, p. 498. 
46"Clear Everything with Sidney" was a phrase the 
licans used to insinuate that the President did not make Repub 
his own decisions. 
47Rosenman, Working, p. 479. 
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he was more aware of the problems of a vast, technological, 
mass society.  "Roosevelt recognized a fact of first impor- 
tance in that America had become a modern, urban, industri- 
alized, interdependent mass society. "48  He was not tied to 
dreamy visions of the nineteenth century or bemused by the 
claims of any ideology.  If he was not a staunch fighter 
for Negro rights, he at least included the Negro in his 
political plans for a better America. 
If the Negro did not make the progress he expected 
under Roosevelt, he had at least become visible within the 
government.  The judicial process was beginning to show 
results with the Smith vs. Allwright decision in 1944 that 
the all white primary was unconstitutional.49  Still, the 
Negro could not make demands until he was politically 
organized and mobilized,and this was not achieved to an 
effective level until after the war.  A second deterrent 
to Negro progress was the war itself.  White America re- 
fused to consider dramatic racial changes while in the 
midst of a total war effort.  The black was asked to be 
patient and wait until the end of the war, and then his de- 
mands would be heard.  The blacks waited, and Harry Truman 
was the man who had to listen. 
48JaCob, Leadership in the New Deal, p. 24. 
49Reynold J. Davis, "A Study of Federal Civil Rights 
Program During the Presidency of Harry S Truman" (unpublish- 
ed thesis at the University of Kansas, 1959), p. 8. 
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RHETORIC OF CIVIL RIGHTS 
First Years of the Truman Presidency 
After the war, the blacks had many reasons to believe 
that they would finally get government action on their de- 
mands.  To begin with, there were many new sources of 
Negro strength at the beginning of World War II which 
could take advantage of any windfall the mobilization and 
fighting might provide.  Perhaps the most important new 
source of strength from a political standpoint was the 
growth of Negro organizations like the NAACP and the Urban 
League.  The two mass organizations could impress candi- 
dates seeking office and men already in office with Negro 
power at the polls. 
The new political strength derived from a movement 
of the Negro population from the rural South to the urban 
areas of the North.  This movement began during World 
War I when agents went south to gather black laborers. 
They gave away free tickets north, and by 1920 there were 
150,000 blacks in New York alone.1  The effects of the 
Domestic Allotment Program upon the black tenant farmers has 
already been discussed.  The net result of the program was 
iottley, New World, p. 35 
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to provide a further impetus to the flight of the Negro north, 
World War II served as a further stimulant to Negro migra- 
tion.  Between 1940 and 1946, over a million Negroes moved 
north to get defense jobs.  In 1940, northern Negroes com- 
prised 4-5% of all potential voters in states like New York, 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois,2 
and the political leaders of those states were well aware 
of that fact.  As long as the Negro vote had been small, the 
Democrats had conceded it to the Republicans.  Roosevelt 
had received only 23% of the black vote in 1932.3  He re- 
ceived better than 60% of it by 1944.  His New Deal and the 
fact that the federal government had 200,000 black employees 
in 1945 had moved the black voter to the Democratic Party.4 
In New York City, despite the establishment of an FEPC by 
Thomas Dewey, the Republican governor, the 350,000 black 
voters of the city voted Independent and re-elected Fiorello 
La Guardia mayor three times.  La Guardia was responsible 
for the hiring of 5,000 Negroes in the city civil service.5 
2William C. Berman, "The Politics of Civil Rights in 
the Truman Administration" (unpublished doctoral dissertation 
at Ohio State University, 1963), Truman Library, p. 7. 
in Ame 
3Roi Ottley, Black Odyssey:  The Story of the Negro 
rica (New York!  Charles Scribners, 1948), p. 265. 
4Ibid., p. 266. 
5ottley, New World, p. 216. 
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In 1943, the Negro had representatives in twelve state 
legislatures; Chicago had William Dawson as a representative 
in the House of Representatives, and Harlem had five Negro 
judges on the city bench.6  Slowly, blacks were moving 
from metropolitan power bases into government. 
Other factors contributed to increased political 
power.  The Negro press had improved and increased its 
circulation.  This made it possible to educate and inform 
black citizens so that it became possible to exert mass 
action and pressure.7 The establishment of the Sojourner 
Truth Homes in Detroit in 1942 and the March on Washington 
were both examples of the effects of the press.  In addition, 
the press encouraged mass economic pressure.  In St. Louis, 
the slogan of the black papers was "Jobs for Negroes" and 
the Urban League organized a boycott of a chain store 
which sold to Negroes but refused to hire them.8  At the 
urging of the Pittsburgh Courier, the Housewives League 
used the boycott against stores which discriminated.  In 
1933, the "Don't buy where you can't work" movement was 
published by the Amsterdam Star.  Unfortunately, the object 
and target of economic boycott was often a Jew since many 
6Ibid. , p. 205. 
7Ruchames, Race, Jobs, and Politics, p. 9. 
8Ottley, New World, p.113. 
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storeowners were Jewish.  The newspapers themselves exhibited 
anti-Semitism and this almost led to a dangerous alliance 
with Nazi front organizations.  Marcus Garvey, a prominent 
proponent of black pride in the 1920's, publicly spoke of 
"Jewish control" of Negro economic life.  Moderates prevail- 
ed over anti-Semitic elements and by 1942 the Crisis and 
the Amsterdam Star were advocating a union of oppressed 
people--Negroes and Jews.' 
There were also new allies for the Negro such as 
the Congress of Industrial Organizations10 which had no 
racial discrimination, and the American Civil Liberties 
Union which was dedicated to protecting the civil rights 
of all Americans.  These new friends were welcomed by a new 
Negro leadership which rejected the old submissive policy 
of leaders like Booker T. Washington.  Men like Roy Wilkins, 
Walter White, and A. Philip Randolph were infected by the 
idea of black pride as enunciated by Marcus Garvey, and 
were not willing to wait meekly for the white man to grant 
equality.11  They were more than willing to use whatever 
pressure they could. 
9lbid., pp. 113-133. 
lOHereinafter cited C.I.O. 
iiRuchames, Race, Jobs, and Politics, p. 9. 
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In 1944, Gunnar Myrdal's study of black Americans was 
published under the title An American Dilemma;  The Negro 
Problem and Modern Democracy.  According to Myrdal, the 
dilemma was the contradiction between "the American dedica- 
tion to high ideals" and her shortcomings in her treatment 
of black Americans. 
Americans are accustomed to inscribe their ideals 
in laws. . . . Legislating ideals has also a 
"function" of dedicating the nation to the task 
of gradually approaching them.^2 
Myrdal saw a number of reasons why the Negro "problem" 
would mount high in importance after World War II.  The 
first reason was the danger of intensified economic disloca- 
tions in the postwar era and their effect on Negro employment. 
He said there would also be new Negro demands because of 
the heightened expectations created by war propaganda which 
extolled the virtues of democracy and the evils of fascism 
and racism.  Racism was completely discredited in American 
propaganda, and the Negro took advantage of the American 
revulsion against genocide.  Another set of factors which 
increased the importance of Negro demands was their increased 
educational level, intensified group consciousness, and 
growing discontent.13 
Not only was the Negro himself changing, but tradition- 
al concepts of race and the Negro were undergoing re-evaluation. 
12p. 14. 
13ibid., p. 27. 
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White racism was being debunked by increased evidence, un- 
covered by scientists and social scientists, that differences 
between the races were more a matter of environment than 
heredity.  Myrdal contributed to this new awareness of 
racial equality when he demonstrated how imprecise the 
word "race" was.-'-4  This intellectual change combined with 
the increased number of jobs Negroes secured during the 
war effort made arguments about Negro inferiority, laziness, 
and inability to handle machinery seem absurd. 
In short, by the end of the war, it had become 
unfashionable in "intellectual" circles to admit the racist 
ideas.  The federal government was finally beginning to 
move away from support of the southern racial system. 
Southern senators were not being allowed to dictate the 
country's racial policies.  There was an increased awareness 
of the political and legal injustices, if not the social 
and personal tragedies, which the Negro suffered.  The 
Negro was no longer a "southern problem" which the rest of 
the country could ignore.  Blacks had become a highly visible 
minority in every northern city, and they had special problems 
for the cities and states to handle.  As Stewart Alsop 
commented acidly in a recent issue of Harper's, the South 
was having its revenge on the North for having won the Civil 
l4Ibid., p. 149. 
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War by "flooding the North with something like ten million 
[1970] functionally illiterate and socially alienated blacks, 
educated according to the hideously discriminatory and un- 
bearably unjust standards of the South."15  The North was 
poorly prepared to handle these destitute, helpless people 
and did very little to improve their condition.  But, 
especially among the educated, the Negro was at least accept- 
ed as a human being and an American citizen. 
There were, of course, southerners who were not 
racists, and who deplored the violence done to the black 
man.  Ralph McGill of the Atlanta Constitution, Hodding 
Carter, editor of a small newspaper in Mississippi, and 
Estes Kefauffer of Tennessee were leaders of an emerging 
"southern liberalism."16  These liberals spoke feelingly 
of a new South, one which would give the black his political 
and human rights.  According to Carter, the South was try- 
ing to improve its race relations, and it was only a matter 
of time before all men would be treated equally.17 These 
men believed that attacks on the poll tax and lynchings 
were unwarranted since few places still had a poll tax and 
lynching was murder according to state laws anyhow.  Southern 
iS-Letters," Harper's, Vol. 241, August, 1970, p. 7. 
i6Emile Bertrand Adler, "Why the Dixiecrats Failed," 
Journal of Politics, XV, 1948, p. 366. 
17New York Times Magazine, August 8, 1948, p. 10. 
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liberals believed that racism was no longer a respectable 
issue, even in the most backward areas of the South, and 
through such interracial groups as the Southern Regional 
Council, they were working to end the poll tax and lynchings.1' 
They also believed that the South would lose the respect of 
the nation, and its political power, if it insisted on main- 
taining its traditional racial policies.  The optimism of 
the men would have been heartening if it had not been dis- 
proved by the continuation and intensification of lynchings, 
beatings, church bombings, and assassinations. 
There were two Supreme Court decisions which helped 
the Negro in the South.  The first struck down the all 
white primary; in the one-party South, the primary was the 
only contest.  The second decision ended segregation in 
interstate travel.  The latter decision was prompted by 
the mistreatment of Negro soldiers during the war.  Soldiers 
often went days without food while travelling because 
restaurants and snack shops refused to serve blacks. 19 The 
families of servicemen faced insults and hunger if they tried 
to visit their men.  Then, there was the added problem that 
most military bases were in the South.  Northern blacks had 
begun to realize just how bad things were and to demand 
federal action. 
18William G. Carleton, "The Fate of Our Fourth Party," 
Yale Review, Spring, Vol. 38, 1949, p. 450. 
l%ew Republic, January 22, 1944.  See also Moon's 
Balance of Power, p. 207. 
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Thus when Harry Truman became president in 1945, the 
problem of civil rights was only one of the many he faced. 
The ending of World War II and the detonation of the atomic 
bomb made civil rights seem a secondary issue.  The black 
man, however, was not about to retreat from the gains, slim 
though they were, that he had made under the New Deal and 
during World War II.  Walker White, the head of the NAACP, 
stated the basic demands of the Negro in a speech given in 
the summer of 1942: 
We demand from America all the rights accorded to 
our white fellow citizens, the rights to which we 
would be entitled if the professed democratic 
ideals of equal rights for all regardless of race, 
creed, or color were really carried out. ... We 
demand the right to live and work for our country 
in defense industries and the right to die for 
our country without segregation or discrimination 
in the armed forces. . . . 20 
Roosevelt had managed to give the Negro just enough improve- 
ment in his station to prevent real trouble, but had not 
altered basic patterns or alleviated basic problems.  This 
was Truman's inheritance. 
The President's background gave no indication of a 
liberal attitude toward race.  He was a compromiser from 
a border state, a state with racial attitudes similar to 
those of the deep South.  He was from a lower middle-class 
family and a small town.  He was a Baptist and a Legionnaire. 
20ottley, New World, p. 248. 
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In short, he had some of the characteristics of a sociologi- 
cal model of a racist.  More importantly for the Negro, he 
was, and is, a decent, honest, fair-minded man of stubborn 
courage. 
Truman's senatorial record on the race issue was 
creditable if not dramatic.  He had supported legislation 
beneficial to the Negro while extremists fought and fili- 
bustered.  For example, in 1938, the Senate considered an 
anti-lynching bill and Truman supported the proposal; in 
addition, he voted to end the southern filibuster on the 
bill.21  Samuel Lubell, a noted political scientist with 
good liberal credentials, attributed his support to oppor- 
tunism:  "All my sympathies are with you," Truman reportedly 
told the filibusterers, "but the Negro vote in Kansas City 
and St. Louis is too important."22 This statement was 
"reportedly" made by Truman, and it has been widely accepted 
as representing the President's true feelings.  Other evi- 
dence leads to different conclusions. 
In 1940, when Truman was running for re-election to 
the Senate, he supported an amendment to the Selective Service 
Act to prevent discrimination against members of minority 
groups who had volunteered for the armed services.  In the 
2lBernstein, Ambiguous Legacy, p. 3. 
22Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics 
(New York:  Anchor Books, 19bb), p. d. 
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Senate, he was, therefore, not associated with the Bilbos 
who fought any legislation designed to improve the Negro's 
lot, but was a supporter of the moderate wing of the Demo- 
cratic Party.23 
During his 1940 campaign, Truman made several rather 
liberal speeches.  On July 14, 1940, he said before the 
NAACP that, 
We all know the Negro is here to stay and in no 
way can be removed from our political and economic 
life and we should recognize his inalienable rights 
as specified in our Constitution.  Can any man claim 
protection of our laws if he denies that protection 
to others?24 
He concluded his speech by saying that he was opposed to 
lynching, segregated housing, and inferior schools for 
blacks.25  In closing he said, "Negroes want justice, not 
social relations," thus betraying the limited nature of 
his racial attitude.26  On July 15, 1940, speaking in 
Sedalia, Missouri, he reaffirmed his statements made the day 
before by saying that "in giving to the Negroes the rights 
23The term "Bilbos" is found in Henry Moon, The 
Balance of Power:  The Negro Vote (New York:  Doubleday, 19 48] 
24Berman, "Politics of Civil Rights," p. 12. 
25Charles R. Bush, "The Truman Civil Rights Program," 
Senior Honors Thesis, Harvard University, April, 1964, Truman 
Library, p. 10. 
26ibid. 
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that are theirs, we are only acting in accord with ideals of 
true democracy."27 
Truman's appeals to democracy and the Constitution 
were not the usual campaign rhetoric.  The obvious respect 
which the man had for both was evident in his speeches and 
is amply borne out in his memoirs.  After reading his auto- 
biography, it is very hard to imagine his using the Constitu- 
tion in a cynical or hypocritical way; his reverence for 
the document is evident throughout the book.  When he said 
the Constitution was meant to apply to everyone, he was 
not using empty oratory before a black audience.  In accordance 
with this belief, in his second term as Senator, he support- 
ed Roosevelt's establishment of the FEPC and, when a bill 
to end the poll tax was blocked by a southern filibuster, he 
voted for cloture.28  He did not make his reputation as an 
advocate of Negro rights, but as a man who insisted on 
even-handed justice for all.29 
Roosevelt's selection of Truman to be his vice- 
presidential candidate in 1944 came as something of a surprise 




27Berman, "Politics of Civil Rights," p. 11. 
28Ibid., p. 13. 
29In his memoirs, Truman summarized his sentiments 
ly: "My only goal was egual opportunity and security 
r the law for all classes of Americans."  Memoirs, II, 
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whom Roosevelt had tapped for vice president in 1940. 
Wallace made the "regulars" in the Democratic Party uneasy 
because of his lofty idealism and such powerful political 
leaders as Edward Flynn of the Bronx, Robert Hannegan of 
St. Louis, Edward J. Kelly of Chicago, and Frank Hague of 
Jersey City were anxious to get a more "professional" vice 
president.  Sidney Hillman, a prominent labor leader who 
was close to the party regulars, was primarily responsible 
for getting Roosevelt to write a note saying either Truman 
or William 0. Douglas was acceptable. Since Truman's name 
was first on the note, it seemed as though Roosevelt pre- 
ferred him.  Truman was not told of this until the night 
before the nomination of the vice president.3"  He had gone 
to the convention committed to James F. Byrnes, but the 
blacks, in a public outcry, had effectively vetoed Byrnes 
for his unreconstructed racial attitudes.31  Truman did 
not believe he was Roosevelt's choice until the President, 
in a phone call to Hannegan which Truman overheard, asked 
Truman to accept out of patriotism and party loyalty.3 
30Truman exclaimed when he learned he was Roosevelt's 
choice, "but why the hell didn't he tell me in the first 
place?"  James Macgregor Burns, The Lion and the Fox (New 
York:  Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1956), p. 4b6. 
31white, A Man Called White, p. 267. 
32Alfred Steinberg, The Man from Missouri (New York: 
G. P. Putnam, 1962), p. 215. 
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Truman was selected because he was from a border state 
and had a good reputation for being a hard worker and an 
honest man.  As chairman of the committee to investigate 
defense contracts, he had quietly saved the government 
millions of dollars.  He was also a man who did not offend 
either white supremists or blacks.  Furthermore, he was 
acceptable to the C.I.O., New Dealers, professional poli- 
ticians, the city bosses, and the South—in other words, 
the major components of the Democratic Party.33  Robert 
Hannegan, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, had 
been his campaign manager in his race for the Senate in 1940, 
and Kannegan pushed hard for Truman's acceptance as vice 
presidential candidate.34 Though the fact that Truman was 
chosen because he was inoffensive seems ignoble, he was 
also chosen for his integrity and loyalty.  Even though 
Roosevelt had not supported Truman for the Senate in 1940, 
Truman did not turn against him.  Truman was a New Deal 
supporter and a political regular on whom the party could 
depend.  Little did the party dream, despite ghoulish talk 
of Roosevelt's health, that within a year Truman would be 
the leader of the nation.  He obviously had good points, and 
33Richard H. Rovere, "President Harry," Harper's 
July, Vol. 197, 1948, p. 28. 
34Dayton D. McKean, "Political Machines and National 
Elections," Annals of the American Association of Political 
and Social Sciences, Parties and Politics, 1948, Vol. 259, 
p".   46. 
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it was meant as a compliment that Alben Barkley, senator from 
Kentucky, called Truman a real "professional."35 
Since Roosevelt did not see fit to brief him on major 
policy decisions, Truman was left at Roosevelt's death with 
little preparation.  With all the responsibilities facing 
him, it seemed to many observers that he would be able to do 
no more than stay afloat.  In fact, he found his feet quickly, 
spending no time worrying about his inadequacies.  He asked 
Roosevelt's cabinet to stay with him and help him through 
the difficult transition period.  All agreed.  The transition 
period was a rather unhappy time, as are all such transitions 
necessitated by sudden death.  Many holdovers from Roose- 
velt's days were anxious to leave the government.  One by 
one they resigned to be replaced by men of Truman's choice. 
As the New Dealers resigned, rumors spread that they were 
being "purged" by Truman.  The only case that could be called 
a real purge was that of Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of 
Commerce. 
After a year of serving in the Cabinet, Wallace became 
convinced that Truman was not following the policies of 
Roosevelt in his relations with the Soviet Union.  Wallace 
thought Roosevelt trusted Stalin and that rapprochement 
3 5Alben Barkley, That Reminds Me (New York:  Doubleday, 
1954)  p  127   Roosevelt had encouraged Lloyd Stark, governor 
of Missouri, to run for Senate.  Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 1, pp. 
159-163. 
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between the two countries was possible.  Truman and his new 
Secretary of State felt differently.  Wallace was also 
chagrined that an upstart from Missouri had become president 
while, he, as Roosevelt's heir apparent, was a mere Secre- 
tary of Commerce.36  In addition, the "upstart" was proving 
to be a very independent chief executive who certainly did 
not ask the advice of the Secretary of Commerce. 
Wallace publicly challenged the President's foreign 
policy in a speech given September 12, 1946.37  He had 
written Truman an unsolicited letter July 23, 1946, which 
Truman had ignored.38  when Wallace realized that he was 
not going to influence foreign policy from within the cabinet, 
he decided to speak out.  Wallace insisted that he had shown 
a copy of the speech to Truman, and that Truman had read it.39 
Truman, in his Memoirs, said that he did not read the speech, 
but that Wallace told him that he was going to examine 
foreign affairs "through Russian eyes."40  At any rate, the 
36William Harlan Hale, "What Makes Wallace Run?," 
Harper's, March, 1948, p. 241. 
37Editorial, New Republic, September 30, 1946. 
38Truman recalls his opinion of Wallace in his Memoirs, 
I, p. 185; he felt Wallace was "honest but inexperienced."  Dr. 
Venkataramani felt that the split between Wallace and Truman 
was a microcosm of the defection of the liberals from Truman. 
39Karl M. Schmidt, Henry A. Wallace;  Quixote Crusade, 
1948 (New York:  Syracuse University Press, 1960), p. 19. 
40Truman, Memoirs, II, p. 557. 
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speech emphasized cooperation and understanding with Russian 
aims at a time when Secretary of State Byrnes was negotiating 
at Paris to get the Russians out of Polish and East European 
affairs.  Byrnes informed Truman that if the President agreed 
with Wallace's speech, he could find a new Secretary of 
State.  Truman had instructed Byrnes to "get tough" with the 
Russians and to quit "babying" them.41  Byrnes certainly 
felt that a speech which envisioned a sphere of influence 
for the Russians was not a part of a "get tough" policy. 
Truman agreed with Byrnes far more than with Wallace and 
asked for the resignation of the Secretary of Commerce. 
Wallace released to the press his letter of July 23, 1946, 
and a split in the Democratic Party and the nation between 
"hard liners" and "soft liners" was opened up.42  The impor- 
tance of this split is examined in a later chapter. 
This was the most acrimonious departure of a New 
Dealer; the others like Frances Perkins, Chester Bowles, and 
Francis Biddle left quietly.  Some of them had spent twelve 
trying years in government and were simply tired.  Others, 
like Harold Ickes, left because they believed their influence 
had waned.  There was a new group seizing the reins of power; 
this group was more midwestern and this gave rise to the charge 
41Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation:  My Years in 
the State Department (New York:  W. W. Norton & Co., 1969), 
p. 190. 
42Ibid., p. 192. 
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of "cronyism" and to the accusation that the President had 
purged good, liberal, New Dealers to make room for his 
friends.4-*  At first glance, this seems a justified complaint, 
but although Truman did turn to those whom he knew and most 
trusted, he quickly readjusted his circle of advisors to 
admit another, new group of advisors which represented the 
ideals, if not the programs, of the New Deal.  These young 
advisors created the Fair Deal and helped the President 
win in 1948. 
The men closest to the President during the first 
months in office were startlingly different from social 
worker types like Frances Perkins and Harry Hopkins.  The 
most highly publicized Truman crony was Brigadier General 
Harry Vaughn, an old friend from Independence.  Evidently, 
Vaughn had always wanted a military career, so Truman made 
him his military aide and a general in the National Guard. 
Although he was widely criticized in the press for favoritism, 
the President stood by his friend.44  In fact, there is 
no evidence that Vaughn was more than a friend who offered 
the President relaxation and companionship—there were other 
men to give him advice on serious matters. 
43Roy V. Peel, "The 1948 Preconvention Campaign," 
Annals, p. 85. 
44Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny (New York: 
A. Knopf, 1952), p. 408. 
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John Snyder, another Missourian, became Secretary of 
the Treasury.  He, however, had experience in government. 
His record in federal-business relations was creditable. 
He had been appointed Federal Loan Administrator, executive 
assistant to Jesse Jones in the Reconstruction Finance Cor- 
poration, and director of the Defense Plants Corporation.45 
Snyder was unpopular with the liberals because of his pro- 
business bias and general conservatism.  Whether he was 
"Babbitish" as Eric Goldman terms him is another question.46 
Robert Hannegan, an old political ally from St. Louis, 
became Postmaster General.  Charlie Ross, an old classmate 
and correspondent for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch became 
press secretary within a month of Truman's becoming presi- 
dent.  This infusion of midwestern blood into the Washington 
artery caused many fevers and shakes in the liberal establish- 
ment.  The press made a fuss over Truman's friendship with 
California oilman Edwin W. Pauley.  Pauley, however, was 
treasurer of the Democratic Party and found the money to 
run the campaigns, and the President could not ignore him. 
Despite dire predictions, Pauley was not rewarded by receiving 
complete control over all off-shore oil rights.47  Leslie 
45Truman, Memoirs, I, p. 56. 
46coldman, Rendezvous, p. 407. 
47ibid., p. 415. 
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Biffle of Arkansas, secretary of the Senate and Dr. John 
Steelman, who was a special advisor on labor, completed the 
circle of midwestern "cronies." 
The President knew he had to have his own cabinet 
and could not work efficiently with men selected by another 
man.  Though he perhaps relied too heavily on friends from 
Missouri in the first few months of his tenture, Truman 
eventually remedied his obvious mistakes and created a 
cabinet which had a great deal of talent.  He appointed 
some outstanding cabinet members, namely, Dean Acheson, 
James Forrestal, Fred Vinson, and George Marshal. 48 What 
is more, he used his cabinet.  He wanted them to give advice, 
and he encouraged conflicting ideas.  However, once de- 
cisions were made, he expected the cabinet members to carry 
them out."  He was loyal to his advisors and expected them 
to be loyal to him. 
The first year of the Truman presidency was charac- 
terized by dramatic foreign events that came with the end 
of World War II, and the President had to pay primary attention 
to foreign policy.  The opening of the United Nations, the 
Polish question, the Russian presence in Eastern Europe, the 
Atomic bomb, and the peace treaties loomed large in the 
48Richard F. Fenno, The President's Cabinet:  An 
Analysis of the Period from Wilson to Eisenhower (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1959), p. 44. 
49lbid. 
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President's thoughts.  There was a chance that the Negro 
would be asked to be patient again—to wait until the post- 
war problems were solved.  Aside from problems of foreign 
policy, Truman had to lead the country to the conversion 
to a peace time economy, solve a massive housing shortage, 
and calm a restive labor force.  Unfortunately for executive 
leadership, Congress had begun to reassert itself and was 
unwilling to follow the President.50  Robert Taft, the 
leading Republican in the Senate, had become a spokesman 
for those who felt the federal government had done quite 
enough in the economic field and that organized labor had 
become too strong.  In working for his domestic and foreign 
programs, Truman faced a formidable opponent. 
The issue of central concern to the Negro during the 
first year of the Truman presidency was the establishment 
of a permanent FEPC.  Though its power had been diluted 
under Roosevelt, it represented the principle that Negroes 
had a right to a fair share of jobs.  The appropriation for 
the continuance of the FEPC was before Congress when Truman 
became President, and in a message to Congress on September 
6, 1945, he endorsed the formation of a permanent FEPC.51 
This was reassuring to liberals and blacks.  He also sent a 
SORovere, "President Harry," Harper's, July, 1948, p. 27, 
51Bernstein, Ambiguous Legacy, pp. 1-10. 
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public letter to Representative Adolph Sabath (D.I11.), the 
chairman of the House Rules Committee, declaring his desire 
that the bill for a permanent FEPC be reported out.-*2 
Unfortunately, all the FEPC eventually got was a reduced 
appropriation.  The wartime FEPC died of malnutrition in 
June, 1946.  All the President had done in his first year 
in office to further civil rights was to speak twice in 
favor of equal opportunity of employment—not a very strong 
civil rights record.  But his advisors at that time were 
not terribly sensitive to the problem, and there were many 
other issues of dramatic importance that needed attention. 
In all likelihood, a voluntary FEPC which relied on moral 
persuasion had outlived its usefulness and was not worth 
a damaging fight in Congress.  During his second year as 
President, Truman showed a greater concern for civil rights, 
Violence in the South drew the attention of the President 
and his administration to the problems faced by black 
Americans and convinced them that the federal government 
had to take action. 
52Ruchames, Race, Jobs, and Politics, p. 126 
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PANTOMIME OF CIVIL RIGHTS 
Truman and the Democrats 1947-1948 
In the months immediately following the end of World 
War II, southern racists once again began to preach hatred 
and violence.  Eugene Talmadge of Georgia and Theodore 
Bilbo of Mississippi ran for office with violently racist 
campaigns.  Five Negroes were lynched in Georgia within 
three days of Talmadge's nomination.  There was an awful 
irony in reading newspaper stories of beatings, lynchings, 
executions and cross-burnings less than a year after the 
same papers had pictured Nazi concentration camps.  The 
fact the violence had been done to black servicemen and 
black veterans increased the nation's and the administration's 
outrage.1 Truman stated that his administration became 
involved in civil rights because the rights of American 
citizens were being contravened, and it was the duty of the 
federal government to protect them.2  President Truman 
personally, as well as legally, could not accept the maiming 
and murder of Americans by Americans without action.3 The 
lWhite, A Man Called White, pp. 322 ff. 
3Ibid. 
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nature of the action he and his administration took surprised 
liberals by its strength.  It served to isolate and outlaw 
the blind racists and deny them the silence of the law; for 
the first time, the nation was informed of specific abuses 
and the compliance of local officials was demonstrated. 
Before this time, the strongest statement on civil rights 
had come from J. Howard McGrath in April, 1944, while he 
was serving as U.S. Solicitor General.  He said any "state 
or party official who attempts to prevent a person from 
voting will be in violation of Sec. 18 of the Criminal 
Code."4  The federal government had assumed limited juris- 
diction over voting rights, but had not done anything to 
stop lynchings.  The old shibboleth of states' rights was 
being used by the South to prevent federal legislation to 
punish lynchers.  The South claimed lynching was murder, 
which it was, under state jurisdiction.  But not a single 
conviction for murder or assault came out of the lynchings 
committed in the South during the 1940's, though those 
guilty were generally known. 
These facts were brought before the President by 
the National Emergency Committee against Mob Violence.  This 
group, led by Walter White and composed of members of the 
so-called liberal establishment, met with the President on 
4Moon, Balance of Power, p. 196. 
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September 19, 1946, just before the congressional elections 
Included in the group were James Carey, secretary of the 
C.I.O.; Boris Shishkin of the American Federation of Labor; 
Dr. Herman Reissig of the Federated Council of Churches 
of Christ in America: Dr. Channing H. Tobias, director of 
the Phelps-Stokes Fund; and Leslie Perry, an administrative 
assistant to the NAACP.5  The groups presented first hand 
accounts of the violence and demanded federal action.  The 
President was shocked and claimed he had no idea things 
were as bad as the group described them to be.6  It is 
tempting to dramatize the President's reaction and argue 
that he underwent a conversion at this point, and became 
dedicated to the cause of civil rights.  Actually, he was 
aware of most of the trouble and had prepared an answer 
to the group's demands before they appeared.7  Truman and 
a special assistant, David K. Niles,had discussed just how 
far the federal government could, and should, go.  Niles, 
a holdover from the Roosevelt administration, suggested 
that the President appoint a committee to investigate the 
charges made by the National Emergency Committee, and to 
report back to the President.  When Truman proposed this 
5white, A Man Called White, p. 330. 
6Ibid., p. 331.  See also, Henry Moon, Balance of 
Power, p. 186.  The most notorious incidents, and the ones 
whTBh upset Truman most according to White, were tne murder 
of two veterans and their wives and the blinding of another 
veteran. 
7Berman, "Politics o f Civil Rights," p. 41. 
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action, Channing Tobias charged that this was no more than a 
dramatic gesture which committed the government to nothing 
specific.8  There is ample evidence to suspect that this 
was exactly what Truman and Niles had planned,9 not because 
they wanted the freedom to do nothing, but because they 
wanted a thorough investigation of the charges. 
When the President announced the formation of the 
President's Committee on Civil Rights on December 5, 1946, 
it was obvious that it was more than a gesture.  The com- 
mittee was composed of forceful, prominent liberals who 
could give an honest appraisal of the violence.  The chair- 
man was Charles E. Wilson, president of General Electric, 
who had publicly stated that civil rights was the most 
important domestic issue facing America.  Also on the 
committee were Charles Luckman of Lever Brothers; Rev. 
Francis J. Haas, Catholic clergyman; Sadie T. Alexander, 
a Negro lawyer from Philadelphia; James B. Carey of the 
C.I.0.| Boris Shishkin of the American Federation of Labor; 
Rabbi Roland Gittelsohn; Frank Graham, president of the 
University of North Carolina; John S. Dickey, president 
of Dartmouth; Channing Tobias, Franklin Roosevelt, Jr.; 
Mrs. M. E. Tilly, a prominent southern churchwoman; Morris 
Swhite, A Man Called White, p. 331. 
9Berman, "Politics of Civil Rights," p. 41. 
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Ernst, a civil liberties advocate; and Francis P. Matthews 
of Nevada, the head of the Knights of Columbus.10 
A report from this group, should the President re- 
lease it and support it, could mean real political trouble. 
It would mean that the problems of black Americans would 
no longer be swept under the rug.  The President charged 
the committee to investigate existing statutes and law 
enforcement measures at all levels of government and 
recommend how each might be strengthened.11 This was the 
first governmental attempt to determine the status of the 
Negro and his relationship to the government in the United 
States, and it made a significant contribution to public 
opinion on race matters.  Thus, as early as December, 
1946, there was a strong indication that the President was 
not going to duck the issue of civil rights.  That there 
were political reasons for this cannot be denied; the 
Democrats had lost control of Congress in November of 
1946, and clearly needed more popular support.  But, the 
important fact is that the President supported civil rights 
when it was not to the party's advantage or his own.  He 
did this in February, 1948,when he publicly endorsed and 
recommended the results of his Committee.  By 1948, violence 
in the South had abated and his strong support of the 
Committee's report was controversial. 
lOwhite, A Man Called White, p. 333. 
HFishel, Rlaek Americans, ?. 78. 
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The first fact to establish is that, in November, 
1946, the Democratic Party was old and tired.  Democrats 
had come to rely heavily on Franklin Roosevelt's coat- 
tails at election time.  The New Dealers had become tainted 
by holding power too long.  The Republican cry "Had 
Enough?" spoke volumes to those who felt the government 
was interfering where it had no business.  War weariness 
and self-sacrifice made the American people yearn for a 
change in leadership.  By November, 1946, the Democrats 
were almost all on the defensive.  In the congressional 
elections, the Republicans were given enough of a majority 
so that they could attempt to legislate as they wished 
to solve the country's problems.  Congress, led by Robert 
Taft of Ohio, took off on a course designed to remove 
price, rent, and food controls in order to allow the 
economy to function "naturally," as they put it.  Republi- 
cans wanted to control the labor unions, and the Taft- 
Hartley Act, passed over the President's veto, did just 
that.  The removal of price controls produced inflation 
and pinched the pocketbook of every wage earner in America. 
The Democrats were able to take advantage of this issue 
in 1948. 
After the Democratic setback of 1946, shrewd Demo- 
crats were planning changes of tactics and personnel. 
Robert Hannegan, the Democratic leader of St. Louis who had 
worked so hard to get Truman the vice presidential nomination 
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in 1944, had served as chairman of the Democratic National 
Committee since 1942.  He was ill in 1946, understandably 
suffering from hypertension.12  Because of this, Hannegan 
resigned in September, 1947, and J. Howard McGrath took 
his place.  McGrath had been governor of Rhode Island 
three times and a U.S. Senator.  Jack Redding, publicity 
director of the Democratic National Committee, credited 
McGrath with having had the faith and enthusiasm for 
Truman which inspired the party to work for Truman's 
election in 1948.  McGrath was a strong advocate of civil 
rights and as Solicitor General had stressed the duty 
of the federal government to protect the voting rights 
of all citizens.13 
The vice chairman of the Democratic National Com- 
mittee, Oscar Ewing, was elevated to director of the 
Federal Security Agency in August, 1947.  His devotion 
to party and president remained extremely strong and he 
was responsible for the creation of the "kitchen cabinet," 
a highly influential group which will be discussed in a 
later section.  Ewing, a Harvard graduate, was deeply 
committed to the idea of a national public health service 
and to social and economic security.  He was to direct the 
12Jack Redding, Inside the Democratic Party (New 
York:  Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1958), p. 40. 
13See above, p. 42. 
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agency which was the forerunner of the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare. 
Gael Sullivan, an Irishman from Rhode Island, was 
a professor of political science.  He had taught at DePaul 
University in Chicago where he worked with Ed Kelly, the 
city's Democratic boss.14  He had served as Hannegan's 
assistant until Ewing quit, whereupon he became vice chair- 
man of the Democratic National Committee.  He was a great 
believer in party loyalty and helped establish closer work- 
ing relations between the President and the party organiza- 
tion.  The groundwork helped in the 1948 campaign, because 
the party organization had been sadly neglected during 
Roosevelt's wartime years.  Sullivan was frequently in hot 
water with the President for his intemperate remarks, but 
he gave the party new zest and enthusiasm.  On "Meet the 
Press" on March 31, 1947, he chastised Henry Wallace and 
Senator Claude Pepper of Florida for their criticism of 
the President's conduct of foreign policy.  This public 
spanking aggravated the two men and incensed the liberals, 
even though Sullivan himself was considered a liberal.  His 
bluntness many times resulted in bad publicity, but his 
very contentiousness and partisanship had the effect of 
creating interest in the party 15 
^Current  Biography,   VIII,   1947,   pp.   618-620. 
15Redding,   Inside,   p.   37. 
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Sullivan's work within the party was innovative and 
the party's image was improved by his energetic, exciting 
style.  For example, he started a weekly news letter which 
lambasted the Republicans.  This was handed out to party 
organizations in the big cities.  He also found the money 
to broadcast a radio hook-up of eight Democratic leaders 
to discuss Democratic policy. 
He had hopes of replacing Chairman Hannegan when 
he finally retired, but his image was tarnished when he 
had an auto accident and was accused of drunk driving. 
Sullivan protested that he had fallen asleep at the wheel 
in hostile, that is Republican, territory, and the drunk 
rumor had been a deliberate smear.  Though this is probably 
true, it sounded far-fetched and his reputation was com- 
promised.  The job went to McGrath and Sullivan took it 
gracefully.16 He continued to contribute suggestions of 
great value, and as will be explained later, formulated 
the basic plan on which Truman's 1948 campaign was run. 
Another new face appeared in 1947.  To most observers, 
Clark Clifford became the most influential of the President's 
advisors.  Clifford was the nephew of the liberal editor 
of the St. Louis Post^Dispatch.17  He favored the 
16Redding, Inside, p. 90. 
17Eric Goldman, The Crucial Decade:  America, 19 4 5- 
1955 (New York:  Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 63. 
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codification of the gains of the New Deal to stop the re- 
gression of the Eightieth Congress.  As a special counsel 
to the President, Clifford advised the use of the presiden- 
tial veto to salvage and protect the New Deal programs that 
were being attacked.  Clifford saw that the problem of the 
future would be the creation and equitable distribution of 
abundance.  He had the optimistic view that American tech- 
nology would produce enough for all Americans.  The only 
problem would be to see that everyone got a fair share. 
The administration, therefore, began to offer a "Fair Deal" 
to the American people.  Like the New Deal, the Fair Deal 
made some provision for the Negro in its programs, and, 
advised by a liberal, well-educated group led by Clifford, 
Truman began to address himself to the special problems 
which black Americans faced.  If the President were think- 
ing of the 1948 campaign as he advocated civil rights, he 
was also moved by the inequities and unfairness which the 
Negro faced. 
One of the first speeches Truman gave after Clifford 
joined his staff in the spring of 1947 was to the thirty- 
eighth annual convention of the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People.  On June 28, 1947, speak- 
ing before the Lincoln Memorial on the stage with Eleanor 
Roosevelt, Truman pledged vigorous support of civil rights: 
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Every man should have a right to a decent home, the 
right to an education, the right to adequate medical 
care, the right to a worthwhile job, the right to an 
equal share in the making of public decisions through 
the ballot and the right to a fair trial in a fair 
court.  We must insure that these rights—on equal 
terms—are enjoyed by every citizen.18 
This is the strongest statement any president had ever address- 
ed directly to Negroes in support of their efforts for equal 
rights and opportunities. 
President Truman was more influenced by the tactical 
advice from the liberals in his administration than by 
close ties to the Negro community itself, or by any unified 
pressure on him to support civil rights from public opinion. 
"The poor and the blacks do not support liberal policies 
even in their own interest.  Liberalism is found among people 
with leisure and education," according to Gunnar Myrdal in 
one of the more memorable statements in his An American 
Dilemma.19  This was true in 1947-48 when a group of young 
liberals, associated with the eastern establishment, gently 
eased an ex-Missouri county judge into a position of leader- 
ship in the matter of civil rights.  Their success in winning 
the President's support and the eventual endorsement of 
civil rights by the Democratic Party constitutes one of the 
more interesting political stories of recent times. 
18New York Times, June 30, 1947, p. 3. 
19p. 73. 
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That there was an unofficial "kitchen cabinet" and 
chat it was openly devoted to liberal policies is freely 
admitted by those who were members.  Janes McGregor Burns 
rives a definition of the eastern establish--er.t whose ideas 
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they were all concerned that more economic and social help be 
given by the federal government.  They believed that govern- 
ment could alleviate human suffering and were not afraid of 
the growth of the federal establishment.  The originator of 
the "kitchen cabinet" was Oscar Ewing, who was still vice 
chairman of the Democratic National Committee when the 
meetings began.  He initiated the meetings after the 1946 
elections when it was obvious to him that Truman had not 
"caught on," as he put it, with the people.  "I felt we 
had to build him up as the champion of various groups," 
Ewing recalled. x 
Those attending the luncheon meetings varied from 
time to time, but the following were the regulars:  Leon 
Keyserling, a member of the Council of Economic Advisors; 
S. Girard Davidson, an assistant secretary of the Interior; 
David A. Morse, an assistant secretary of Labor; Charles 
S. Murphy, an administrative assistant to the President; 
Charles Brannan, an undersecretary of agriculture; George 
Elsey, an assistant to Clark Clifford; David Bell of the White 
House staff; and Clark Clifford.  According to Clifford, 
The idea was that the six or eight of us would 
try to come to an understanding among ourselves 
on what direction we would like the President to 
take on any given issue.  And then, quietly and 
unobtrusively, each in his own way, we would try 
to steer the President in that direction. . . . 
21Nichols, Breakthrough, p. 84 
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We were pushing him the other way [away from Taft 
Conservatism] urging him to boldness and to strike 
out for new, high ground.  He wasn't going to placate 
that Republican Congress, whatever he did.22 
These men were extremely influential in shaping the President's 
Fair Deal, and worked steadily for his re-election in 1948, 
which they felt depended on his maintaining a liberal image. 
Sullivan was pondering campaign strategy during the 
summer of 1947.  On August 19, 1947, he submitted a report 
to Clifford called Victory in 1948:  Precinct to President.2^ 
In this paper, Sullivan urged that the stress should be on 
the humanity of the Democratic Party.  He urged that the 
President and the party identify themselves with the "little 
man" who was worried about prices, housing, employment, 
illness, and debt.  Included definitely in Sullivan's planning 
was the courtship of the Negro vote; as he noted, the blacks 
worried about the same things as the white "little man." 
Sullivan concluded by suggesting that the President should 
get closer to the people and give informal "off the cuff" 
speeches.  He even suggested a cross-country train trip so 
that middle America could see and hear the President in person, 
not as he was pictured in a hostile or indifferent press. 
22Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency;  A History 
of a Triumphant Succession (New York:  The Macmillan Co., 
1966), p. 164. 
23papers of Clark Clifford, Political File, 1947-48, 
Box 19, Truman Library. 
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A final bit of political strategy was determined in 
November, 1947.  Acting upon the suggestions of Sullivan and 
the "kitchen cabinet," Clifford submitted a confidential memo 
to the President on his plan to win election in 1948.  The 
plan hinged largely on the issue of civil rights.  Clifford 
wrote that the South could safely be ignored in their ob- 
jections to federal support of civil rights.  He believed 
the South would not revolt just because the government 
officially opposed lynchings, poll taxes, and discrimination. 
Further, he said there was no longer any need to placate 
southern congressional leaders since they were not support- 
ing Fair Deal legislation anyhow.  He believed there was 
more to be gained by courting other factions whose votes 
would be won on the basis of liberalism rather than on 
racism and fiscal conservatism. 
The second point of the Clifford memo was that despite 
the President's troubles with labor, he would be able to 
gain its support in a national election.  His veto of the 
Tart-Hartley Act and overall record of support for labor 
would compensate for his tough tactics against the railroad 
and mine worker unions.  The most virulent Truman hater, 
John L. Lewis of the United Mineworkers Union, had been iso- 
lated, and attacking him had not hurt Truman with the rest 
of labor.24 
24Clark Clifford to the President, Memo, Papers of 
Clark Clifford, Political File, Box 21. 
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The whole theory, therefore, was to develop a more 
liberal image for the President, not to try to be more 
conservative than the Republicans.  The most important posi- 
tion to take, according to Clifford, was the support of 
civil rights.  Clifford subscribed to a widely popular notion 
that the Negro vote held the balance of power in the up- 
coming presidential election.25 According to this theory, 
the northern Negro voter held the balance of power because 
he voted in a bloc, geographically concentrated in pivotal, 
large, and closely contested electoral states like New 
York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan.  Clifford's 
memo stated that the northern Negro knew that he could not 
get political satisfaction as long as the southern conser- 
vatives ran the Democratic Party.  Therefore, the President 
must win the confidence of the Negroes and the liberals by 
doing more than uttering cynical political promises.  He 
strongly urged the President to take strong action in favor 
of civil rights. 
In the back of Clifford's mind during all this time 
was the threat of Henry Wallace as a presidential candidate 
on a third party ticket.  On December 16, 1946, after his 
dismissal by Truman, Wallace became editor of the New Republic, 
By assuming this position, he had acquired a national maga- 
zine as a forum for his ideas.  In the main, his articles 
1948. 
25see Henry Moon, Balance of Power:  The Negro Vote, 
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proposed an end to distrust of the Soviet Union and an end 
to the building of war material.  In his first editorial, 
he enunciated his program of "Jobs, Peace, and Freedom" to 
oppose the Tryman-Byrnes policy of armed preparedness. 
Wallace believed that the way to peace was to abolish such 
causes of war as starvation and ignorance.  The industrial 
nations must assist the rest of the world by helping them 
build roads, dams, and irrigation projects.  There must 
be freedom of passage through the Panama and Suez Canals, 
the Dardanelles, and along the Danube.  Middle Eastern oil 
must be available to everyone.  The Jews must have a home- 
land.  In a note of prophecy, Wallace predicted that if 
the arms race between Russia and the United States continued, 
the defense department and the large industries would join 
forces to produce a subtle fascism because this military- 
industrial complex would control more jobs than any fifty 
corporations.26 Just as the "doves" are claiming in 1971, 
America had problems of housing, crime, pollution, and 
racism to be solved and had no business wasting money on 
atomic bombs and arms for Greece and Turkey.  These were 
Wallace's basic positions and they differed from Truman's 
considerably. 
26New Republic, December 16, 1946 
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Truman felt Wallace was well-meaning but inexperi- 
enced.^7 Truman and Byrnes were well aware of Russia's 
desire for a buffer zone along her western frontier, but 
were not willing to sacrifice the national aspirations of 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, East Germany, 
and Yugoslavia to make Russia happy.  Consequently, the 
Americans and the Russians were not reaching agreements to 
guarantee the peace.  Inside the self-proclaimed liberal 
community, was a group which felt that Truman was inexperi- 
enced in international affairs and insensitive to American 
domestic needs.  Therefore, they reasoned, Russian truculence 
and American domestic unrest were his fault.  Wallace was 
the embodiment of this sentiment. 
In December, 1946, some of the disgruntled New 
Dealers like Guy Tugwell, Chester Bowles, and Leon Hender- 
son joined with Wallace and other "progressives" to form 
the Progressive Citizens of America.28  The aim of the 
organization was to supplant the "pseudo-liberal" Democratic 
Party with a "truly liberal party."  The primary objective 
of the P.C.A. was to obtain peace with Russia based on 
"understanding" and compromise, on the assumption that both 
countries wanted a better life for their citizens.  By 
27Truman, Memoirs, II, p. 185. 
28Cited hereinafter as P.C.A. 
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eliminating the distrust between the two countries, the arms 
race would end and free vast sums of money to spend on the 
"common man" and the underdeveloped countries.  This was 
an attractive program, particularly to a war-weary liberal. 
At its rallies and meetings, the P.C.A. stressed 
time after time the understanding of Russia's aims and 
problems.  This led in some cases to laying the entire blame 
for cold war tensions on Truman and his "hard line" against 
the expansion of Russia.  The Truman Doctrine, by sending 
arms to Greece and Turkey to suppress Communist insurgency, 
upset Wallace and the P.C.A. since it once again meant an 
increase in militarism.  The Marshall Plan was more to 
their liking, but was still criticized for its aim—to stop 
the spread of Communism.  Eventually, it dawned on many 
liberals that the Russians were being difficult themselves 
and that good intentions did not necessarily bring peace. 
Certain members of the P.C.A. became objects of suspicion 
because of their seeming approbation of all things Russian, 
and a split developed between those who were either Communists 
or were overly sympathetic to all things Communist, and the 
liberals who rejected Communism as an oppressive, totalitarian 
system.   The anti-Communist liberals formed the Americans 
for Democratic Action29 to preserve the reputation of 
liberalism and to keep liberals free of suspicion by the 
29Cited hereinafter as the A.D.A. 
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red baiters.30 The A.D.A., as will be seen later, had con- 
siderable influence on the leaders of the Democratic Party 
and played a significant role in making civil rights a part 
of the 1948 party platform. 
Besides the challenge from the left as represented by 
the P.C.A., the President was also faced with renewed demands 
by Negroes themselves for more attention to civil rights. 
They dramatized their cause by delivering a petition to the 
United Nations on October 23, 1947.  In the petition the 
NAACP prayed for relief from the discrimination suffered by 
Negroes in the United States.31  This move was not unprece- 
dented.  William Monroe Trotter, leader of the National 
Equal Rights League in the 1920's, had taken a job as a ship's 
waiter to get to Europe to present the American Negro's case 
before the League of Nations.  The preface of the document 
submitted to the United Nations, written by W.E.B. DeBois, 
eloquently revealed the hypocrisy of the United States' 
preaching democracy and freedom while denying fundamental 
rights to American Negroes.32 The Soviet Union proposed 
making a crime of the "advocacy of national, racial and 
religious hostility or of national exclusiveness or hatred and 
30Schmidt, Quixote Crusade, p. 28. 
31Moon, Balance of Power, p. 203. 
320ttley, New World, p. 38. 
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contempt as well as any action establishing privilege or 
discrimination based on distinctions of race, nationality, 
or religion [sic]."33 The treatment of the Negro had become 
embarrassing internationally,and Britain and France were 
indignant that the United States could lecture them on 
colonialism while treating black Americans far worse than 
they treated colonials. ^ 
The high point of civil rights in 1947 was the de- 
livery of the report of the President's Committee on Civil 
Rights.  The President allowed it to be made public on 
October 27, 1947.35  The report was specific and precise 
and even Walter White praised it as, "an almost perfect 
yardstick ... by which can be measured the gap between 
what Americans say they believe and what they do."36 The 
committee specified four rights to which they said all 
Americans are entitled:  (1) the right to safety or security 
of person, (2) the right to citizenship and its privileges, 
(3) the right to freedom of conscience and expression, 
(4) the right to equality of opportunity.37  Not only did 
33Moon, Balance of Power, p. 203. 
340ttley, Black Odyssey, p. 311. 
35Berman, "The Politics of Civil Rights," p. 1. 
36White, A Man Called White, p. 333. 
37To Secure These Rights:  The Report of the President's 
Committee~on Civil Rights (Washington, D. C:  U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1947), p. 6. 
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the committee define these rights, but spelled out with de- 
tails, garnered from witnesses under oath, the way in which 
these rights were abridged in the United States.  They 
pointed out that the South in particular obstructed rights 
of Negroes, and came out strongly against lynching. 8  The 
conclusion of the report was a list of changes which could 
be made to protect the rights of all citizens equally. 
Briefly, the report urged:  (1) that the Civil Rights section 
in the Justice Department be strengthened and that the F.B.I, 
and state and local authorities establish civil rights sec- 
tions, (2) that civil rights commissions be established at 
the national, state, and local levels, (3) that police 
forces be professionalized, (4) that federal laws protecting 
personal safety be strengthened, (5) that an anti-lynch law 
be enacted by Congress, (6) that the Thirteenth Amendment 
forbidding involuntary servitude be enforced, (7) that the 
claims of Japanese Americans detained in camps during World 
War II be reviewed and processed, (8) that the poll tax be 
ended, (9) that voting abuses in party primaries be ended, 
(10) that discrimination in the Armed Services be ended, 
(11) that legislation to control excessive influence of special 
interest groups in all levels of government be enacted, 
(12) that segregation be eliminated, (13) that a permanent 
38 Ibid., p. 23. 
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FEPC be established, (14) that equality of education, health, 
and housing be guaranteed, and (15) that a program of educa- 
tion to end prejudice be initiated. 
Perhaps the feature of the report that caused the 
most turmoil was its specific mention of the South.  In some 
cases the names of both cities and states were given, and 
even law officials were mentioned by name.  This tore away 
the curtain of anonymity behind which the South had hidden 
its worst offenders.  The report logically and unemotionally 
exposed the fear and violence used to keep Negroes "in their 
place." 
Most Southerners were outraged that the report was 
made public; they assumed that the President would have to 
repudiate the work of the committee if he intended to be 
nominated by the Democratic Party.  Those most disturbed, 
like Strom Thurmond and Lister Hill, believed that the 
Southern delegates could deny the nomination to the President. 
The rabid racists predicted violence and civil war if the 
report were adopted.  In the South, visions of doom and 
destruction appeared to otherwise responsible newspapers and 
leaders.  In the midst of the fury, President Truman remained 
unperturbed.  He let the nation know what was on his mind 
in his State of the Union message on January 7, 1948.  He 
announced his support of the Committee's findings and his 
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intention to deliver a special message to Congress on February 
2, on the matter of civil rights.39 
39Bernstein, Ambiguous Legacy, p. 14. 
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THE EXECUTIVE ACTS ON CIVIL RIGHTS 
The Adoption of Civil Rights by the Democratic Party 
When President Truman announced his support of the 
Civil Rights committee's report, he was criticized for 
making a political maneuver to win the Negro vote.  Supposed- 
ly, his endorsement of civil rights legislation was a 
desperate attempt to win the approval of liberals and 
Negroes who were following Wallace; at this time the P.C.A. 
was drawing strong support from these two groups.-'-  Accord- 
ing to this theory, Truman endorsed civil rights at a 
time when he was very low in the public opinion polls and 
was trying to regain popularity.  Political expediency 
called for him to keep discreet silence, as some party 
officials urged.2  In fact, the President was getting high 
ratings in October-November, 1947.  The papers showed grow- 
ing support for Truman during the summer of 1947.  Primarily, 
people were pleased with his success in handling John L. 
Lewis.  Both the Gallup and Roper Polls showed Truman strength. 
^Bernstein, Ambiguous Legacy, p. 14. 
2Bush, "The Truman Civil Rights Program," p. 36. 
3Newspaper clippings, Papers of Clark Clifford  Politi- 
cal File 1947-48, Box 19.  No one seems to make the claim that 
if the President had not endorsed his committee, that that 
would have been political too. 
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But by March 8, 1948, his stock was very low, indicating that 
he had hurt himself by taking a stand because of principle. 
Jack Redding, publicity director for the National Committee, 
stated flatly that presidential support of the report had 
hurt politically more than it had helped.4 The Washington 
Post concurred: 
The Democrats have been advancing with their wings 
in the air.  Now they are gravely imperiled on each 
flank.  To the left harassed by Wallace and his 
pinkcoated partisans.  To the right they are not 
only menaced by the heavy dragoons of Big Business 
in cuirasses of gleaming gold and bristling plumes 
fashioned from the stubs of innumerable checkbooks, 
by isolationist ambushes and by the Parthian warrior 
of fanatical constitutionalists; they are also 
threatened with the defection of some of their own 
best-disciplined and hitherto most dependable troops, 
namely the Southern Democrats.5 
The charge that the President's support of civil rights was 
motivated solely by politics is unfounded, but there was 
a political strategy behind his speech on February 2, when 
he requested legislation to effect some of the reforms 
suggested by the committee. 
Clark Clifford had made his position on civil rights 
known in his memo to the President in November, 1947.  He 
publicly urged the President to adopt the committee's report 
as his own.6  He reported that although the polls kept dropping, 
^Redding, Inside the Democratic Party, p. 133. 
5Quoted in ibid., p. 153. 
6Bush, "The Truman Civil Rights Program," p. 31. 
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supposedly because of his stand on civil rights, the letters 
to the President were five to one in favor of his stand.7 
Further, Clifford told the President that he must offer more 
than political promises to the Negro to get his vote.  As 
mentioned, Clifford did not believe that the South would 
completely repudiate the Democratic Party, mainly because 
of tradition.  Also, the South had its share of decent men 
who hopefully could drown out the extremists.  In addition, 
the southern leadership in Congress was loath to surrender 
its power in Congress by following another party.  In the 
end, Truman got more votes in the South than Thurmond and 
Dewey.8  Clifford's conviction was reinforced by his aide, 
George M. Elsey, who wrote Clifford that "the Negro votes 
in the crucial states will more than cancel out any votes 
he [Truman] may lose in the South."9  Hopefully, endorsing 
civil rights would only drive the worst bigots out of the 
Democratic Party while winning support from groups that 
were skeptical of Truman's liberalism.  As will be seen 
later, the support of civil rights did not help measurably 
in assuring the support of the liberals, at least for his 
nomination. 
7Davis, "A Study of Federal Civil Rights Program," 
p. 91. 
8William G. Carleton, "The Fate of Our Fourth Party, 
Yale Review, Spring, 1949, p. 455. 
Campaign Material 1948, Papers of Clark Clifford, 
Political File, Box 20. 
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After the President made a strong speech on civil 
rights in February, the Chairman of the Democratic National 
Committee, J. Howard McGrath, met with Southern governors 
on February 23 to listen to their demands.  Jack Redding 
suggested a compromise to McGrath in a pre-meeting caucus 
and was told, "there'll be no compromise. No compromise. 
As chairman, I'm not going to push this thing one spot fur- 
ther than the President's message.  But neither will I 
withdraw one inch from the confines of that message."10 
The governors protested and threatened but the party leader- 
ship did not give an inch.  Thus the Democratic Party was 
committed to a calculated risk:  take an unpopular but 
principled position and hope for rewards at election time. 
The Democrats took this chance on the basis of analy- 
sis by a small "think tank" which had been established at 
the suggestion of Oscar Ewing.  Under the leadership of 
William Batt, Jr. , a Research Division of the Democratic 
National Committee was created.  Batt, the son of a Phila- 
delphia industrialist, had served as vice chairman of the 
War Production Board.  He was also the leader of the A.D.A. 
in Philadelphia.11  Beginning at the first of January, 1948, 
Batt gathered a group to supply the "kitchen cabinet" liberals 
10Redding, Inside, p. 134. 
13-New York Times Magazine, August 1, 1948, E-5. 
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with ideas and information.  The President knew of the group 
and approved.12 
The first discussions along this line were mainly 
between Batt, Ewing, and Clifford, and they came to several 
conclusions.  They felt the President should take the offen- 
sive early, and attack the record of the Republican Congress. 
The State of the Union speech was the first step in the 
direction of a reawakened Democratic Party.  The consensus 
of the group was that Dewey would be the Republican nominee 
and that he had a fairly liberal record as the governor of 
New York; he had created a state FEPC, hired blacks, sponsor- 
ed aid to education, and was hailed as incorruptible.13 But 
the Republican Congress had given the Democrats a great 
deal to campaign on.  They could blame Congress for failure 
to stop inflation, for blocking housing construction, for 
promoting tax cuts for the rich, for high prices and the 
end of price controls, for cutting funds for school lunches 
and FEPC, for Taft-Hartley, and for catering to the rich.1 
After the President's speech on civil rights, the Republicans 
could also be blamed for blocking civil rights legislation. 
12William L. Batt Interview, July 26, 1966, Transcript, 
Truman Library, p. 1. 
13"Editorial," Crisis, January, 19 48. 
14Peel, The 1948 Preconvention Campaign," Annals, p. 79 
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All of this was a handy campaign position; the President 
could endorse and propose legislation which he knew would 
not pass, and then "give 'em hell" when nothing was done by 
that "no good, do-nothing, Eightieth Congress."  It was 
beautiful in its simplicity. 
The President wanted the campaign fought entirely on 
domestic issues since foreign policy was a bipartisan effort. 
Actually, in foreign affairs the Congress had a rather good 
record and the Democrats could not take sole credit for 
that.15 Also, domestic affairs traditionally had been more 
important in national elections than foreign affairs.  So, 
while Dewey was campaigning for the nomination with his 
efficient, well-oiled organization, the Democrats were pre- 
paring to strap all the Republican troglodytes to his back 
and make him carry the onus of their actions. 
The first person Batt approached for the "think tank" 
was Kenneth Birkhead, son of Dr. L. M. Birkhead, the executive 
director of the Friends of Democracy.16 Birkhead was chosen 
because he and his father were active in the NAACP.    The 
Friends of Democracy did research into anti-democratic pro- 
paganda.  Batt, knowing Birkhead's specialized knowledge of 
15Batt Interview, p. 12. 
16New York Times Magazine, August 1, 1948, E-5. 
17Batt Interview, p. 28. 
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fringe groups, felt he would be useful in combatting Henry 
Wallace's movement.  Said Birkhead: 
I originally was contacted by Batt, who is a 
longtime friend of mine because it appeared 
early in the year [1948] that the Wallace 
movement—the Progressive Party, was going to 
be a major problem in the campaign and that 
it had a lot of extreme left-wingers in the 
country associated with it. . . . 18 
Other men were added and contributed their expertise. 
Johannes Hoeber had been in charge of labor relations for 
the Philadelphia Community Chest.  Philip Dreyer came from 
Oregon and had served with Batt on the American Veterans 
Committee.  David Lloyd was an A.D.A. lawyer and later be- 
came the executive director of the Truman Library Corporation, 
Frank Kelly of Kansas City, was a newspaperman and Nieman 
Fellow.  He later became vice president of the Robert 
Hutchins group, the Center for Democratic Studies,in Cali- 
fornia.  Finally, to do the more menial tasks, was John 
19 Barriere, a recent college graduate. 
The group was basically a research team to provide 
information to the President.  The National Committee was 
not very impressed with the Research Division and McGrath 
felt they were "ivory tower. "20  The group made itself felt 
18Kenneth M. Birkhead Interview, July 17, 1966, Trans- 
cript, Truman Library, p. 2. 
J-^ibid. , pp. 1-3. 
20Ibid., p. 13. 
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mainly through Charles Murphy, administrative assistant to 
Clark Clifford, both of whom were involved with the presi- 
dential campaign at the White House.21 Birkhead worked with 
Philleo Nash, another presidential advisor, on civil rights.22 
They all favored taking a positive approach to civil rights 
and Birkhead reported: 
The President consciously made a decision that he 
was not going to win that election by being anti- 
civil rights; that he wasn't going to get the vote 
of the people in the South by coming out against 
civil rights. . . . 
I personally thought the Negro vote could make 
the difference because I thought this [election] 
was going to be a squeaker. 23' 
Birkhead urged that the President campaign especially hard 
in New York and Pennsylvania and that he talk not only about 
civil rights, but about black housing and jobs. 
The entire Democratic campaign was given a jolt on 
February 17, 1948, when Leo Isaacson, the P.C.A. candidate 
for a vacant congressional seat in the Bronx, won the elec- 
tion.  After studying the results of the election, Oscar 
Ewing came to the conclusion that the Negro vote would go 
20-3 0% to Wallace in New York in the November election.  To 
21Ibid., p. 14. 
22Ibid., p. 18. 
23Ibid., pp. 19-22, 
24Ibid. 
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stop this drift, the Democrats had to get a Negro campaign 
organizer, feed more material into the Negro press, and 
secure executive orders to establish an FEPC for the Execu- 
tive Branch and to end discrimination in the Armed Services.25 
Wallace was also making inroads into the Negro vote in the 
South.  Elmo Roper, the pollster, reported that a Negro 
sample taken mainly in the South found 24% of Negroes would 
vote for Wallace, and 4% of the whites would.  Specifically, 
29% of the Negroes interviewed liked Wallace most for his 
program of racial equality.26  The P.C.A. called for an end 
to segregation of any minority anywhere under the American 
flag.27 
The blacks were disappointed with Truman because he 
had come out strongly in February and then had fallen silent. 
The immediate complaint was that he did not eliminate segre- 
gation in the armed forces by executive order as commander- 
in-chief.  Instead there were lengthy meetings between Negro 
leaders and the administration.  Truman met with A. Philip 
Randolph and Grant Reynolds who threatened civil disobedience 
if no action were taken.  They testified before the Armed 
25Bill Batt to Gael Sullivan, April 20, 1948, "The 
Negro Vote," Papers of Clark Clifford, Political File, Box 21, 
26Elmo Roper to Dr. Herbert Hyman, April 5, 1948, "The 
Wallace Vote and the 1948 Elections, ibid. 
27Goldman, Rendezvous, p. 417. 
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Services committees of both houses.  Roy Wilkins and Lester 
Granger met with the Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, 
on April 26, 1948.  Forrestal, a backer of the Urban League, 
had begun to integrate the lily-white Navy during World 
War II.28  The Air Force had been cooperative under the 
leadership of Stuart Symington.  But the Army under Secre- 
tary Kenneth Royal1, a southerner, resisted integration.29 
Royall said publicly that the Army was no place for social 
experimentation and he received no executive reprimand.3^ 
There was further criticism of the administration because 
it did not push a government policy to combat discrimina- 
tion in its own civil service and because there was a reduc- 
tion in the budget of the Criminal Division of the Department 
of Justice which contained the Civil Rights Section.31 
Obviously, the President was walking a thin line by taking 
a firm stand on civil rights, then lying low to avoid com- 
plaints that he had gone too far—and that he had not gone 
far enough.  There was no way to please both extreme wings 
of the Democratic Party. 
28Nichols, Breakthrough, p. 61. 
29Crisis, May, 1948. 
30Bush, "The Truman Civil Rights Program," p. 45. 
31Ibid. 
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Strangely enough, after Truman announced his intention 
to seek nomination on March 23, 1948, the liberal wing and 
the southern wing of the Democratic Party temporarily join- 
ed forces.  Labor leaders and the northern bosses were the 
first to desert the President.  They were convinced that 
Truman was a loser, and neither group could afford to be 
caught supporting a loser.  Dave Beck of the Teamsters Union 
even came out as a Republican.32  The South had been dis- 
affected since the appointment of the Committee on Civil 
Rights.  Although it had been proved that great generals 
do not necessarily make great presidents, Dwight Eisenhower 
made an irresistible candidate.  Both parties tried to 
get him to announce his candidacy.  But Eisenhower had 
promised Truman he did not want political office.  Eisen- 
hower's disavowals did not deter the Draft Eisenhower Com- 
mittee which featured such figures as James Roosevelt, leader 
of the movement, and Chester Bowles, Leon Henderson, Claude 
Pepper and Hubert Humphrey representing the A.D.A. wing 
of the Democratic Party.  From the big cities were bosses 
Jake Arvey of Cook County, Illinois, Paul O'Dwyer of New 
York, Ed Flynn of the Bronx, and Bill Lawrence of Philadel- 
phia.  Joining this already odd combination were such 
southern luminaries as Strom Thurmond, Lister Hill, Richard 
32Redding, Inside, p. 156. 
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Russell, and John Stennis.33  United by their dislike of 
Truman, this group kept the papers filled with Eisenhower 
headlines.  They were undeterred by the fact that they had 
no idea what Eisenhower's political views were.34 
In March, the President's stock was at an all-time 
low point.35 James Roosevelt had embarrassed Howard Mc- 
Grath the previous month at the Jefferson-Jackson dinner 
in California by standing up and endorsing Eisenhower. 
Poor planning spoiled the surprise, however; long-winded 
after-dinner speakers droned on until 2 a.m., dampening 
Eisenhower enthusiasm.3^ Wallace forces seemed to be 
riding high; the South was openly hostile to the President. 
March, not April, was the cruelest month. 
On March 12, the President enjoyed one small break. 
The Russians invaded Czechoslovakia and this justified Tru- 
man's tough policy toward the Russians.37 It undermined 
33Jules Abels, Out of the Jaws of Victory (New York: 
Henry Holt, 1959), p. 73. 
34Clifton Brock, Americans for Democratic Action: Its 
Role in National Politics (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs 
Press, 1962), p. 92. 
35"Editorial," Washington Post, March 8, 1948. 
36Redding, Inside, p. 162. 
37Berman, "The Politics of Civil Rights," p. 85. 
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Wallace's position of conciliation and when some of the 
P.C.A. defended the Soviet Union, they increased the sus- 
picion that there were many communists within the party. 
More liberals, men who genuinely admired Wallace, sadly 
left the P.C.A. because of its pro-Russian cast.38  The 
Negro press had held back from endorsing Wallace all this 
time, although he was the "sentimental favorite," and 
"straight on the question."  But his record was not perfect. 
He had kept the Department of Commerce segregated and had 
refused to speak at NAACP meetings.39 The dire results 
of his agricultural policies have already been discussed. 
This rather cool appraisal of Wallace by the Negro press 
prevented the P.C.A. from gaining an overwhelming lead in 
the black areas, and Truman was able to counter its pro- 
mises with executive action once he won the nomination. 
The real initiative was seized when the President 
took a "leisurely, non-political" trip across the country. 
Party funds were in such short supply in June, 1948, that 
the party could not pay for the President's travel.  Luckily, 
the University of California at Berkeley invited the Presi- 
dent to speak at commencement and to receive an honorary 
38New York Times, July 8, 1948, p. 13. 
39Crisis, February, 1948. 
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degree,40 thus enabling him to cross the country on an 
official function.  On June 3, the train left Washington 
and the first speech Truman delivered indicated that some 
changes had been made.  The President had had an unfortunate 
speech style before then, relying on speeches written by 
a staff and cabinet still accustomed to penning lofty phrases 
that would have been far more appropriate to Roosevelt. 
These long, florid speeches fell flat when pronounced in 
Truman's midwestern twang.  Obviously, the phrases were not 
his.  He had experimented with a new style in a Young 
Democrats speech in May and it had been warmly received.41 
The new style allowed the President more freedom to form 
his own phrases and deliver "off the cuff" remarks.  William 
Batt and his Research Division began supplying the President 
with material boiled out of lengthy statistics and put into 
digestible, understandable form.42  Instead of fully written 
speeches, the President was given an outline of facts, local 
color, and local issues.  He then put them into his own 
words.  By the time he returned to Washington on June 18, the 
people of the United States had heard their President and 
were responding warmly.  The train trip was an idea claimed 
40Alfred Steinberg, The Man from Missouri (New York: 
G. P. Putnam, 1962), p. 31^  It is interesting to speculate 
on this invitation.  Ed Pauley, party treasurer, had resigned, 
and returned to California, but he was still aware of party 
finances, loyal to Truman, and influential. 
41Batt Interview, p. 12. 
42Birkhead Interview, p. 3 08. 
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by Gael Sullivan and Jack Redding, and it was used in the 
campaign later with great effectiveness.43 
The Republicans met for their convention on June 20 
in Philadelphia.  Thomas Dewey of New York and Earl Warren 
of California were nominated.  Warren was a valuable addi- 
tion because he had a good liberal reputation as governor 
of California.  The Republicans not only wrote a fairly 
strong civil rights plank into their platform, but also 
came out against lynching, the poll tax, and racial segrega- 
tion in the armed forces.44 As mentioned, Dewey, as 
governor of New York, had a fairly strong civil rights 
record, having established a state FEPC and appointed Negroes 
to policy making positions.4^ 
The Progressive Party convention was a novelty of 
the first order.  Many artists and artistic types had join- 
ed the party, and the convention was planned by experts in 
theatrical production.  Lights and action differentiated 
the P.C.A. from the other party conventions. Charles P. 
Howard, a Negro, gave the keynote address.46 The platform 
43Redding, Inside, p. 52. 
44Berman, "The Politics of Civil Rights," p. 95. 
45Crisis, January, 1948. 
^Lionel V. Patenaude, "The Presidential Election of 
1948 from a Contemporary Point of View," unpublished thesis 
from the University of Texas, 1949, Truman Library. 
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opposed segregation anywhere under the American flag.47 
Senator Glen Taylor of Idaho, an eccentric cowboy singer, 
was chosen as vice presidential nominee.  He had been arrest- 
ed in Birmingham, Alabama, for using the "colored entrance" 
of the auditorium where he was speaking and he and Wallace 
had regularly refused to speak to segregated audiences.48 
The highlight was Wallace's nomination and acceptance speech, 
carefully orchestrated for the optimum effect.  In his 
speech he took his usual strong stand in favor of civil 
rights and called for the "second emancipation" of the 
Negro.  As minimum goals, he declared that lynching and the 
poll tax must end.49 The "new party" was able to formulate 
a liberal platform since there were no conservatives or 
racists with political power who had to be placated.  The 
Democrats and the Republicans were not so lucky. 
When the Democrats gathered in Philadelphia, the 
party was still badly split.  General Eisenhower had finally 
refused to consider a draft as presidential nominee on July 
6.50 The stop-Truman forces then turned to Supreme Court 
47Goldman, Rendezvous, p. 417. 
^Newsweek, XXXI, May 10, 1948, p. 24. 
49New York Times, July 25, 1948, p. 36. 
50New York Times, July 6, 1948. 
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Justice William O. Douglas, who refused on the grounds that 
he would not use the Court as a stepping stone to the presi- 
dency.51 Claude Pepper of Florida offered himself, but by 
this time the city bosses were abandoning the lost cause, 
the liberals were feeling embarrassed, and the revolt was 
over.  Meanwhile, the liberals and Southerners were at 
each others ■ throats and determined to drive each other 
out of the party. 
Nowhere was the animosity stronger than in the plat- 
form committee.  Clark Clifford, Bill Batt, and Jack Redding 
had all had a hand in drafting the platform.  Clark Clifford's 
draft of the civil rights plank read: 
We assert our conviction that no nation can 
flourish which condemns any of its peoples to 
second class citizenship or which tolerates 
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, 
color or national origin.  We favor legislation, 
recommended by President Truman, by which the 
Federal Government will exercise its full consti- 
tutional power to assure that due process, the 
right to vote, the right to live, and the right 
to work shall not turn on any consideration of 
race, religion, color, or national origin.5'1 
The final draft which was submitted to the full committee, 
after thorough discussion of political expediency read: 
We again state our belief that racial and 
religious minorities must have the right to 
live, the right to work, the right to vote, 
SlBrock, Americans for Democratic Action, pp. 94-95. 
24, 194 
2papers of George Elsey, Speech File, June 4-November 
8, 1948 Presidential Campaign (July), Box 8, p. ±>- 
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the full and equal protection of the laws, on 
a basis of equality with all citizens as 
guaranteed by the Constitution.53 
Other presidential advisors decided that the Clifford ver- 
sion was too strong and specific.  They also believed, as 
the President well knew, that the party platforms were 
always vague and had little political value.  He saw no 
reason to antagonize a faction of the party over one section 
of the platform.  The South was willing to compromise by 
putting in the 1944 civil rights plank plus an equally 
vague states' rights plank.  The 1944 civil rights plank 
read as follows: 
We believe that racial and religious minorities 
have the right to live, develop and vote equally 
with all citizens and share the rights that are 
guaranteed by our Constitution.  Congress should 
exert its full powers to protect those rights.54 
Obviously, the administration was trying to patch up rela- 
tions with the South, since the plank submitted by the 
administration to the platform committee was even weaker 
than the 1944 plank which the South was willing to accept; 
the administration draft did not mention any action by 
Congress and the 1944 civil rights plank does.  Of course 
in 1944, there was no full program of civil rights before 
Congress as there was in 1948. 
53ibid., p. 12. 
54New York Times, July 3, 1948, p. 9 
There were those who were determined to prevent com- 
promise with the South on civil rights.  Though the moderates 
were in control of the platform machinery, debate and hot 
discussion took place in the platform subcommittee.  Senator 
Francis J. Myers of Pennsylvania was chairman of the plat- 
form committee and Senator Scott Lucas of Illinois was 
chairman of the subcommittee which considered civil rights. 
On the subcommittee were Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, 
Esther Murray of California, and Andrew J. Biemiller of 
Wisconsin, who was running for Congress.55  At hearings on 
civil rights held July 9, 1948, Guy R. Brewer of New York, 
a lobbyist for civil rights, warned the subcommittee that 
"if the Democrats pussy foot on civil rights as the Republi- 
cans did, our people will cry 'a plague on both your houses' 
and flock to the new party."56 Walter White, as a spokesman 
for twenty-one Negro organizations with 6,084,000 members, 
wanted to know if the Democratic Party would continue to 
be dominated by bigots.  He claimed to have three million 
voters who wanted an end to lynchings, poll taxes, discrimina- 
tion in the armed forces and in transportation, and equality 
in education and employment.  Roy Wilkins, as chairman of 
the executive committee of the National Council for a Permanent 
FEPC, also spoke for his group's interests. 
55New Republic, July 26, 1948, pp. 10-11. 
56New York Times, July 9, 1948, p. 7. 
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Despite the eloquence of the Negro speakers, the 
moderates who wanted to placate both sides prevailed.  The 
eighteen-member platform drafting subcommittee drew up the 
following: 
The Democratic Party is responsible for the great 
civil rights gains made in recent years in elimina- 
ting unfair and illegal discrimination based on 
race, creed, or color. 
The Democratic Party commits itself to continuing 
its efforts to eradicate all racial, religious, and 
economic discrimination. 
We again state our belief that racial and religi- 
ous minorities must have the right to live, the 
right to work, and the right to vote, the full and 
equal protection of the laws, on a basis of equali- 
ty with all citizens as guaranteed by the Constitu- 
tion.57 
Hubert Humphrey, Esther Murray, and Andres Biemiller 
drew up two amendments to make the plank more meaningful: 
We highly commend President Harry S Truman 
for his courageous stand on the issue of civil 
rights. 
We call upon the Congress to support our 
President in guaranteeing these basic and 
fundamental American Principles:  (1) the right 
to full and equal political participation; 
(2) the right to equal opportunity of employment; 
(3) the right of security of person; (4) and the 
right of equal treatment in the service and de- 
fense of our nation.58 
The elders of the party opposed a strong plank, feeling 
that it was sure to split the party and cause the Democrats 
Schnapped 
p. 198. 
57Harry S Truman, address and Messages,ed  MB. 
ped, (Washington, D. C: Public Allans Press, 1949), 
58ibid. 
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to lose in November.59  The amendments were voted down by 
the subcommittee, so when the majority plank was submitted 
to the full platform committee, Humphrey and the other 
liberals, all members of the A.D.A., submitted their amend- 
ments as a minority report.  The whole committee, under 
Myers' leadership, rejected the amendments in a bitter 
fight.  Humphrey announced that he would take the minority 
report to the convention floor.  Scott Lucas of Illinois 
declared that the A.D.A. was trying to destroy the party,^° 
and called Humphrey a "pipsqueak. "61 The amendments were 
voted down in full committee 7 0-30.62 But a floor fight 
was imminent. 
The men in control of the convention, Truman's 
supporters, were moderates who represented the center of 
the party.  Like Sam Rayburn, the permanent chairman, they 
were committed to holding the party together as an effec- 
tive working organization in both the North and South. 
59Hubert H. Humphrey, Beyond Civil Rights:  A New Way 
of Equality (New York:  Random House, 1961), p. 31. 
60Brock, Americans for Democratic Action, p. 97. 
61Humphrey, Beyond, p. 32. 
62Ibid. 
63Paui T. David, Ralph M. Goldman, Richard C. Bain, 
The Politics of National Party Conventions (Menasha, Wis- 
consin!      The   Brookings   Institute,   1960),   p.   6.. 
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The men who managed Truman' s nomination were not the men 
who pushed for a strong civil rights plank, but there was 
a high correlation between those who supported the civil 
rights amendment and those who voted for Truman on the 
first ballot.64  Truman's good friend Leslie Biffle was 
the sergeant at arms; he doled out the tickets and prevent- 
ed any anti-Truman demonstrations.6^ The delegates were 
mainly lawyers, judges, realtors, and other non-salaried 
types.66  One important segment of the Democratic Party, 
labor officials, was conspicuously absent.  Over all the 
conventioneers there was a feeling of gloom and defeatism. 
The opening-day proceedings began miserably.  The 
"Star Spangled Banner," sung by Lawrence Tibbetts, was 
pitched so high he sounded as though he were strangling. 
Van Heflin tried to deliver an eulogy to the war dead 
above the talking and laughter of conventioneers who could 
not hear what he was trying to do.  Finally, the eulogy 
ended with the playing of "Taps"-off key.67 Keynoter Alben 
Barkley helped revive spirits with one of his typically 
of  Conve 
64Gerald Pomper,   Nominating  the President:     The Politics 
vention  Choice   (Chicago":      Northwestern  Press,   1963)   p. 
^Steinberg,   The Man  from Missouri,   p.   315. 
66David et al.,   The Politics,   p.   337. 
67Newsweek,   July   26,   1948. 
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partisan, round-house speeches.  He made no special plea for 
or against civil rights, and hoped that party loyalty would 
help everyone forgive and forget.  He quoted Jefferson, say- 
ing "all men are created equal," then applied it largely 
to foreign countries.68 The closest he came to civil rights 
was in saying that there certainly was equality of black 
and white, red and yellow—not equality of physical, moral, 
financial, social or intellectual standing—but the equality 
of right to "enjoy the blessings of free government" in 
which all may participate and to which they all "have given 
their consent."69 Though he drew a pitiful picture of the 
war-torn refugees, he did not mention the Negro. 
The attempt at restoring unity by McGrath, Barkley, 
and Rayburn was demolished the next day by a black delegate, 
George Vaughn of Missouri.  Vaughn filed a minority report 
to the report of the credentials committee which had accept- 
ed the Mississippi delegation.  Vaughn pointed out that at 
their convention on June 22, the Mississippi Democrats had 
voted to walk out if the platform did not guarantee states' 
rights and Truman did not drop civil rights.70 This was the 
^Democratic Party National Convention> Proceedings, 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1948, University of Michigan 
Library,Ann Arbor, Michigan, Microfilm 3061 (3), p. 
69Ibid. 
70Ibid., p. 103. 
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first mention of civil rights on the floor.  Further, he 
stated, the Mississippi delegation was not bound to support 
Truman if he were nominated, or any other candidate who 
accepted a civil rights program.71 Vaughn and the minority 
recommended that the Mississippi delegation not be seated. 
This was signed by Vaughn, Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois, 
Charles E. Misner of Michigan, Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota, 
W. T. Thompson of Nebraska, Thomas E. Delahanty of Maine, 
and Mrs. H. W. Sawyer of Nevada.72 
With the convention in an uproar, Vaughn gave a 
passionate defense of Truman's civil rights program, citing 
the need to end lynching, poll taxes, and to grant equal 
employment opportunities, inter-state travel without discrimina- 
tion, and equal educational opportunities.73 He used the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments as the justification 
for full civil rights, and pointedly noted that there were 
fifteen million Negroes in America who were gaining their 
voting rights. 
In voting whether to accept the minority report of 
the credentials subcommittee, Barkley insisted on a voice 
vote and declared the minority report defeated.  Illinois, 
7llbid. 
72Ibid. 
73Ibid., p. 105. 
94 
New York, and California all insisted that the record show 
that they had supported the minority report.74 Later, at 
their own insistence, Connecticut, Iowa, Michigan, Minne- 
sota, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington, Wisconsin, 
and Washington, D. C. were added to the list of those who 
had supported the minority report.  This was a significant 
grouping of states in that it roughly paralleled the voting 
in November.  Truman did win the midwestern states by being 
liberal, much to the surprise of the Republicans. 
Wright Morrow from the Texas delegation delivered 
a minority report calling for the restoration of the two- 
thirds majority necessary for nominating a presidential 
candidate.  This was offered in the hope that Truman's nomi- 
nation could be blocked.  Oscar Ewing, who attended the 
convention as a New York delegate, fought against the motion 
successfully.75 Claude Pepper of Florida supported the 
return to the two-thirds rule, probably because he still 
hoped to be a dark horse nominee, It was clear that those 
who continued to advocate a return to the two-thirds rule 
wanted to regain veto power over the bulk of the party.76 
On the night of July 13, the liberal forces had an all 
night meeting, presided over by *.D.A. president Leon Henderson. 
74Ibid., p. 107. 
75Ibid., p. 109. 
76David et al., The Politics, p. 213. 
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When they realized they could not block the nomination of 
Truman, the liberals decided to channel their efforts to 
secure a firm plank on civil rights in the party platform. 
Humphrey had tried to convince the platform committee and 
failed.  Now, since Andrew Biemiller had agreed to submit 
the minority report to the floor of the convention, they 
had to organize support to get their report adopted.77 
Once again, as in the Draft Eisenhower movement, there was 
a coalition of city bosses and liberals.  Humphrey admits 
that Ed Flynn, boss of the Bronx, urged him to go ahead 
with the floor fight.  Flynn promised him the support of New 
York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois.78  This community of 
interest existed because the big city politicians were 
acutely aware of the power of the Negro vote in the cities. 
The Negro vote in the big northern cities, if delivered, 
could win the November election.  What some liberals were 
supporting for humanitarian reasons made good political sense. 
As Oscar Ewing, who studied the value of the Negro vote care- 
fully, said in opposing a return to the two-thirds rule, 
"We can't sacrifice principle to placate the South."   He 
left unsaid what he had written previously to Bill Batt, 
77Brock, Americans for Democratic Action, p. 97. 
78Humphrey, Beyond, p. 39. 
79Democratic Proceedings, p. 116- 
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"The Democrats can't win the election without the vote of 
the northern Negro."80 Politics and principles are often 
quite compatible. 
At the fifth session of the convention on July 14, 
the platform committee made its report.  Francis Myers made 
the report on civil rights, which read: 
We again state our belief that racial and 
religious minorities must have the right to 
live, the right to work, the right to vote, 
and the full and equal protection of the laws, 
on a basis of equality with all citizens as 
guaranteed by the Constitution.SI 
The states' righters spoke first and gave their minority 
report.  Dan Moody of Texas read the report which emphasized 
the power and independence of the states, and Cecil Sims 
of Tennessee and Walter Sillers of Mississippi seconded 
the report. 
The pro-civil rights minority report, with its en- 
dorsement of President Truman and the Civil Rights Committee, 
was read by Andrew Biemiller on behalf of himself, Humphrey, 
and Esther Murray.  In the heated debate that followed, 
Maurice J. Tobin of Massachusetts urged that the platform 
be left alone.  Next Hubert Humphrey stood to speak for the 
adoption of the Biemiller report.  He said that the world 
Negr 
BOsill Batt to Gael Sullivan, April 20, 1948 , "The 
o Vote," Papers of Clark Clifford, Political File, Box 20 
81Democratic Proceedings, p. 176. 
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was being challenged by slavery and that the United States 
must be in a morally sound position.  He insisted that there 
could be no double standard in the United States. 
I say this, that the time has arrived in 
America for the Democratic Party to get out of 
the shadow of states' rights and walk forth 
rightly into the sunshine of human rights.82 
Aaron L. Jacoby, another New York delegate, seconded Humphrey 
and said there was no more need for states' rights; that 
the need was to end discriminatory practices against any- 
one. S3 The speeches were given a dramatic ending by the 
Honorable James M. Curley of Boston who stood to toast the 
Irish.84 
Moody's states' rights report was defeated 309-925. 
When it was time to vote on the Biemiller report, the chair- 
man of the California delegation, John F. Shelly, stood 
and requested a roll call.  The required one-fifth of the 
convention agreed, and the roll of the states began. Those 
delegations whose majority voted "yea" were California, Colora- 
do, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachu- 
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, 
82Ibid. , p. 191. 
83ibid., p. 193. 
84Ibid., p. 194. 
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Wyoming, Washington, D. C, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Vir- 
gin Islands.  The final tally was 651-1/2 yeas and 582-1/2 
nays.  The A.D.A. civil rights plank had passed.85 
The voting showed the strength of opinion of big city 
bosses and the midwest.  The Illinois delegation was split 
by the issue, and Jack Arvey and Ed Kelly seized control 
of the delegation from moderate Scott Lucas.86 The bosses 
of Chicago and Cook County knew the political price they 
would pay if they did not support civil rights.  David 
Lawrence of Philadelphia, Frank Hague of Jersey City, William 
O'Dwyer of New York, and, of course, Ed Flynn of the Bronx 
lent their support.  South Dakota was carried by idealism 
Q n 
and their delegation leader, Hubert Humphrey's father. 
Paul Douglas of Chicago began the demonstration after the 
Humphrey speech.  According to Humphrey, the vote signified 
a new commitment; he pointed out that there was no political 
gain for states like Minnesota, Wisconsin, and South Dakota 
for there were few Negroes in these states.88 This is 
precisely why the midwestern and western states could be 
so moralistic about civil rights. 
85Ibid. , p. 210. 
86New Republic, July 26, 1948, pp. 10-11. 
87Humphrey, Beyond, p. 39. 
88 Ibid. 
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The President's feelings about the adoption of the 
stronger civil rights plank were no doubt mixed.  According 
to Humphrey, the tribute to the President was calculated 
to please him and win support of the moderates.  All the 
good A.D.A. liberals claimed the President opposed the 
stronger plank because it was too radical.  The Southerners 
thought Truman was determined to ram civil rights down 
their throats.  A reporter asked Strom Thurmond as he led 
thirty-five southern delegates out of the convention on 
July 14, why he was taking such an extreme step.  Said the 
reporter, "President Truman is only following the platform 
Roosevelt advocated." "I agree," Thurmond said, "but Truman 
means it. „89 Truman and his advisors felt the platform was 
fairly unimportant—they generally are.  While it was no 
doubt gratifying to be praised, Truman also felt it was 
gratuitously aggravating to the South.  As he told James 
Forrestal, he had not personally wanted to go as far as 
the Democratic platform had gone on civil rights.  He also 
had no animus toward the southern delegates who had voted 
against the civil rights plank and against his nomination, 
"I would have done the same thing myself if I were in their 
place and came from their states."90  Undoubtedly, Truman 
89steinberg, The Man from Missouri,p. 315. 
90james Forrestal, Diaries (New York:  Viking Press, 
1951) , p. 455 
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also knew there would be no civil rights if he did not get 
nominated and elected, and there was no point, in his esti- 
mation, in driving out a sizable segment of the Democratic 
Party.91 
The convention dragged on to its end.  Truman and 
Alben Barkley were finally nominated at 2 a.m., July 15. 
Both spent those long hours sitting backstage on folding 
chairs.  Upon their appearance for their acceptance speeches, 
some theatrical soul had decided to release doves from a 
"monstrous floral Liberty Bell."92  The hour was a good deal 
later than anticipated, however, and several doves passed 
away.  No one wanted a dead pigeon as a party symbol, so 
hurried arrangements were made for the deceased.  Finally, 
the surviving birds were released.  Some flopped pitifully, 
while others strafed the audience, including Mrs. Truman.93 
"One perched on Sam Rayburn's head," said Truman.  "Was 
Sam disgusted.  Funniest thing in the convention."94 
Miraculously, the President had not lost his spirit or his 
91New Republic, July 26, pp. 10-11.  It is interesting 
to speculate on whether Elsey, Clifford, Ewing, and Batt were 
in fact hoping to drive the more conservative racists out of 
the party.  All four urged at various times that the South 
did not have to be placated. 
92ibid. 
93Newsweek, July 26, 1948, 
94Steinberg, Man from Missouri, p. 317. 
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sense of humor.  He made a rousing speech, promising to call 
Congress back into session on July 26 to see if the Republi- 
cans meant all the things they had said in their platform. 
The convention responded enthusiastically, and at least ended 
on an optimistic note. 
102 
EPILOGUE 
Having secured the nomination, President Truman used 
his executive powers to create a board to hear cases of 
discrimination in federal employment and declared a policy 
of equality of opportunity in the armed forces.  A committee 
on equality of treatment and opportunity in the armed forces 
was established.1  Typically, the President was criticized 
both for doing too much and not enough.  His action was 
the first concrete step in ending racial discrimination in 
the federal government. 
Politically, the Negro vote had an important place 
in Truman's plans for re-election.  As Clifford had advised 
in November, 1947, Truman spoke out on civil rights.  The 
Research Division produced a "File of Facts" which included 
the President's support of civil rights and listed eight 
Negroes the President had appointed to policy making posi- 
tions.2  In addition, a two-color comic book on Truman's 
life and civil rights support was printed and distributed in 
iBernstein, The Ambiguous Legacy, p. 21. 
2Papers of George Elsey, Speech File, 1948 Presiden- 
tial campaign, Reference file 18, Civil Rights folder, File campaign 
of the Facts. 
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the Negro wards.3  Batt, writing to Clifford, urged that the 
President spend most of his time during the campaign in the 
seventeen states which went to one major party or the other 
by a very narrow margin in 1944.  These were Connecticut, 
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.4  In 
these states the vote differential was 1.9% in 1944.  Clif- 
ford forwarded this advice to the President on August 17. 
Meanwhile, the second phase of the election strategy 
was being explored.  Besides standing for civil rights, 
the President was also to assume a liberal stance in the 
midwest.  Clifford had urged in the November, 1947 memo 
that the example of the elder Robert M. LaFollette should 
set the tone of the campaign.  LaFollette had run ahead of 
Democratic candidate John W. Davis in 1924 by being more 
liberal than Calvin Coolidge, not by trying to be more con- 
servative, as Davis had done.  In the "File of Facts" were 
statistics to show how little the Republicans had done for 
the farmers.  Almost accidentally the file contained the nota- 
tion that the Republicans had voted not to spend money to 
3john P. Davis to David K. Niles, September 11, 1948, 
Files of Philleo Nash, Presidential Speeches and Messages, 
Box 29. 
%ill Batt to Clark Clifford, August 11, 1948, Papers 
of Clark Clifford, Political File, Box 20, p. 3. 
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build wheat storage bins.  When Truman, on one of his train 
trips, arrived at a town where grain was stacked in the 
streets, he made a dramatic impact by citing exactly the 
reason for such waste.5 He used this example to berate the 
Republicans for their "do-nothing Congress." 
The election results bear witness to the soundness 
of the Clifford-Batt strategy.  Truman lost only five western 
and midwestern states:  Oregon, North Dakota, South Dakota, 
Nebraska, Kansas.  In the East he lost only Maine, New 
Hampshire, Vermont, New York, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, 
New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland.  Only South Carolina, Ala- 
bama, Mississippi, and Louisiana voted for Thurmond.  The 
total was 304 electoral votes to Dewey's 18 9, and Thur- 
mond' s 38.  Wallace carried no state.6  The defection of the 
Midwest was a real shock to the Republicans, and as Clif- 
ford and Elsey predicted, Truman did not lose very badly 
in the South.  According to Walter White, he won his 
majority in Illinois, California, and Ohio by his heavy 
majorities in the Negro districts. 
White reported to the President on November 30, 1948. 
According to statistics compiled by NAACP offices all over 
the country, Truman carried the Negro vote 3:1 nation-wide. 
5Memo to the President, August 17, 1948, 1948 campaign, 
ibid., Box 21. 
6patenaude, The Presidential Election of 1948, p. 13 3. 
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White claimed that the Negro vote provided the balance of 
power in Ohio, Illinois, and California.  According to 
White, in Ohio the Negro districts of Akron and Cleveland 
gave Truman 65,000 more votes than Dewey, and he carried 
the state by 7,107.  Truman received a 32,512-vote edge over 
Dewey in the Negro districts of California to take the state 
by a 70,000 vote majority.  In Illinois, Truman carried 
Chicago by 128,541 to win the state by 33,612.7  These three 
states also voted for the strong civil rights plank at the 
convention.  The Negro vote had now become an important 
part of the Democratic coalition.  Wallace did not even 
carry Harlem.  Truman had given a speech there on October 
29, and convinced the Negro of his sincerity.8  While 
southern Democrats continued to hold power in Congress, at 
national party conventions they were to be outvoted and 
their racist view publicly repudiated.  The moderates and 
A.D.A. liberals emerged as the dominant majority within the 
Democratic Party at convention time at least.  Both extreme 
wings, racists and Wallacites, were defeated and the Demo- 
cratic Party emerged as the party of the moderate reform. 
Wallace had not carried the Negro vote as well as he 
had expected.  He lost votes primarily because Negro leaders 
?New York Times, November 30, 1948, p. 21. 
>Dav is,   "A Study of  Federal Civil Rights,"  p.   129. 
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1 
knew he could not win.  Walter White was able to present 
Truman with an "IOU" in November, 1948, that he would not 
have had if the Negro had voted for Wallace en masse.  He 
would have lost some influence in the Democratic Party.  The 
communist influence in the P.C.A. damaged Wallace's reputa- 
tion among the blacks.  Also, Truman had a tangible record 
as chief executive and his own "sincerity" to run on. 
The Truman personality cannot be discounted as an important 
element in his victory. 
Dewey campaigned as a young statesman far above mun- 
dane politics.  The main theme in his campaign speech—he 
seemed to have only one—was "unity."  According to an ad- 
mittedly biased source, Kenneth Birkhead, the Dewey campaign 
reminded the press of feudal times; he would make formal 
appearances, utter a few profound comments, and withdraw. 
On the Truman train, the President would wander back to the 
press car, look over reporters' shoulders as they wrote, 
and even correct their copy.9 The press liked Truman more 
than Dewey, but felt he could not win.  William Batt, after 
all the campaign strategy he plotted, concluded: 
In the last analysis, that margin was probably 
provided by the personality of the two men and the 
fact that President Truman is just personally a 
more human and more attractive person, and in whom 
people had more confidence than they drd in Dewey. 
9Birkhead Interview, p. 27. 
10Batt Interview, p. 20. 
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Though he tried to play the statesman's role, Dewey always 
gave the impression that he was a politician.  But while 
Truman was constantly accused of playing politics, he 
showed indisputable qualities of statesmanship.  There was 
no discernible hypocrisy or elitism in his makeup.  If he 
said he believed in equal rights for all men because that 
is what the Constitution says, he meant just that.  Perhaps 
Jack Redding summed up the interaction of idealism and 
politics as well as any commentator did: 
Politics, by definition, is the art of govern- 
ment.  Too often this definition is lost sight of 
and the word used in an opprobrious sense.  Harry 
S Truman was a politician but he never played 
"politics." 
Perhaps a better word for politics is leader- 
ship, for the best politicians are leaders.  But 
to be successful, these leaders or politicians 
must have faith in the people, faith that the 
people, when they know the facts, will take the 
proper course of action.H 
President Truman continued to support Negro rights in 
his second term.  The armed forces were finally desegregated 
and the federal civil service ended discrimination.  Primary 
advances were made through court action, however.  Truman's 
more advanced legislative programs languished in Congress. 
The significance of the first term of his administration is 
the growing recognition of the Negro's voting strength and 
his demands.  The President and the Democratic Party both 
became convinced of the righteousness of the Negro's cause, 
11Redding, Inside, p. 308. 
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